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ABSTRACT 
Managing Pharmaceutical Research and Development Portfolios:  An Empirical Inquiry into 
Managerial Decision Making in the Context of a Merger  
 
By 
 
Catrina Marie Jones 
 
May 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair:  Danny Bellenger 
 
Major Academic Unit: Executive Doctorate in Business 
 
Most research and development portfolio managers face one common problem:  They are 
expected to select projects for a portfolio that will yield high returns and a viable pipeline for future 
growth.  The onset of a merger or acquisition adds complexity to existing portfolio management 
challenges.  Prior research has shown that most research and development projects fail or terminate 
after a merger or acquisition, especially within the pharmaceutical industry.  This research takes a 
case study approach to examine how managers make decisions during the portfolio management 
process.  We apply a narrative-based decision theory to explain what influences their decisions.  
The major findings that emerged are: (1) post-merger processes and methods are applied with 
greater rigor and lack integration, (2) managers’ perspectives on how they make decisions differ 
from reality, and (3) managers inject personal criterion into standardized portfolio evaluations. We 
contribute to the literature on portfolio management by providing insight into merger influences 
on managerial decision making. The implications of R&D post-merger portfolio shrinkage are 
discussed.   
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I INTRODUCTION  
I.1 Problem Statement 
 
Firms that engage in research and development (R&D) face a critical task of selecting 
portfolios that will contribute to both its short and long-term profitability. The process for 
selecting a portfolio has proven to be challenging due to manager’s inability to predict portfolio 
outcomes.  These challenges are further extended when the complexity of a merger is integrated 
into the portfolio management (PfM) process.  Prior research reveals that mergers require the 
integration of key functions of a firm, especially the R&D functional area.  Within the 
pharmaceutical (pharma) industry, the results of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have shown 
significant declines in R&D, demonstrating the potential need for more effective post-merger 
PfM processes. One of the key components of pharma PfM is portfolio selection.  Although 
pharma portfolio selections are often driven by financial analyses, there is also a requirement for 
managers to make decisions based upon the output of these financial valuations and other criteria 
identified by the firm.  Prior research on pharma PfM processes suggests that managers’ 
portfolio decision-making behaviors are often altered based on the strategies set forth by the 
executive team.  For example, a study conducted by Smith and Sonnenblick (2013) revealed that 
because executives had difficulty terminating projects so that more viable projects could be 
added to the portfolio, managers followed suit and went against their recommendations year after 
year by allowing projects that should be terminated to remain the R&D portfolio.  The 
motivation behind managers’ decisions needs to be further explored within pharma, especially 
after M&A, so that firms can become aware of executive influences on managers’ portfolio 
decisions and seek out ways to eliminate these distractions.  After a pharma merger, portfolio 
selections become even more critical since wrong decisions can be detrimental to a firm. 
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According to the Wall Street Journal, there were over 112 deals announced in 2015, 
making it the biggest M&A Year of all time (“2015 Becomes the Biggest M&A Year Ever, 
2016).   More than $200 billion was at play in the last round of M&A activity within the pharma 
industry – a frenzy that includes 14 deals announced in 2014 ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’: 
The Strategy Behind the Pharma M&A Rush," 2014).  PharmaZeta acquired Warner-Lambert in 
2000 for $90 billion.  As a result of this merger, PharmaZeta found itself saddled with some 
businesses it didn’t want ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’: The Strategy Behind the Pharma 
M&A Rush," 2014).  Japan’s Daiichi Sankyo in 2008 bought a 64% stake in Ranbaxy for $4.2 
billion, but problems followed soon thereafter, with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
banning the U.S. distribution of drugs produced in Ranbaxy facilities in India after discovering 
lapses in regulatory compliance ("'Trying to Recapture the Magic’: The Strategy Behind the 
Pharma M&A Rush," 2014).  Pharma firms spend billions yearly engaging in M&A seeking to 
develop and grow R&D portfolios.  Table 1 displays the Top 25 M&A deals in 2013.  These 
deals included acquisitions of small to large-sized pharma firms. 
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Table 1 Top 25 M&A Deals in the Year 2013 
Acquired Firm Acquiring Firm Price 
Thermo Fisher 
Scientific 
Life Technologies $13.6 billion 
Amgen Onyx Pharmaceuticals $10.4 billion 
Valeant 
Pharmaceuticals 
International 
Bausch + Lomb $8.7 billion 
Perrigo Elan About $8.6 billion 
Actavis Warner Chilcott About $8.5 billion 
AstraZeneca Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS; 
Diabetes development operations) 
Up to $4.3 billion – including 
$2.7 billion upfront, up to $1.4 
billion tied to regulatory and 
sales-based milestones, and up to 
$225 million to transfer of assets. 
AstraZeneca also agreed to pay 
BMS royalties on set sales 
through 2025 
Shire ViroPharma About $4.2 billion 
BayerHealthCare Algeta $2.9 billion 
Patheon NewCo More than $2.6 billion 
Salix Pharmaceuticals Santarus $2.6 billion 
Mylan Agila (injectables business of 
Strides Arcolab Ltd.) 
Up to $1.75 billion 
Grifols PharmaIota (blood transfusion 
diagnostics unit) 
$1.657 billion 
Madison Dearborn 
Partners 
Ikaria About $1.6 billion 
Endo Health Solutions Paladin Labs About $1.6 billion 
KKR PRA International More than $1.3 billion 
AstraZeneca Pearl Therapeutics $1.15 billion 
GlaxoSmithKline GlaxoSmithKline 
Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (India 
pharmaceuticals subsidiary) 
$1.028 billion (Rs. 54 billion) 
Jazz Pharmaceuticals Gentium About $1 billion 
Johnson & Johnson Aragon Pharmaceuticals Up to $1 billion 
Allergan MAP Pharmaceuticals $958 million 
Otsuka Pharmaceutical Astex Pharmaceuticals $886 million 
Cubist Pharmaceuticals Trius Therapeutics $704 million 
Novo A/S Xellia Pharmaceuticals $700 million 
Akorn Pharmaceuticals Hi-Tech Pharmacal $640 million 
Pharmstandard 
 
Beaver Pharmaceutical Pte Ltd. $590 million 
Data obtained from GEN Insight and Intelligence website (2015) 
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Table 2 shows three major mergers and its post-merger portfolio outcomes. The strategic motives 
of all three mergers involved R&D savings.  However, the outcomes were decreased 
expenditures due to budget constraints and pipeline deterioration.  Merged pharma firms tend to 
focus on short-term projects that can be developed cheaper and faster with favorable profits.  As 
a result, pipelines of some of the largest pharma firms have shown significant declines.   Merged 
pharma firms need to find the balance between staying risk averse and satisfying short-term sales 
targets without sacrificing future growth (Smith & Sonnenblick, 2013).   
Although merged pharma firms have applied reputable valuation methods to aid in the 
selection of an optimum portfolio, R&D declines suggest that better decisions are needed, and 
more effective portfolio processes could be adopted.  These declines could partially be attributed 
to the behaviors of managers responsible for making portfolio decisions.  To achieve growth, 
firms need to understand why pharma R&D portfolios are less successful after a merger.  
Gaining insight into what managers are actually doing throughout the PfM process could provide 
possible answers for the decline of R&D success. 
To appropriately manage a firm’s portfolio, decisions must be made on when to fund 
projects so that long-term growth can be established (Kester, Griffin, Hultink, & Lauche, 2011).  
Making the wrong portfolio decisions can be devastating to a firm’s budget, and new PfM 
strategies may need to be developed.  Deciding on the right portfolio can mean the difference 
between remaining competitive and falling behind (Martinsuo, 2013).  Within the automotive 
industry, executive leader Bill Ford acknowledged in 2006 that it was management’s failure to 
make the right portfolio decisions that led Ford Motor into financial trouble (Kester et al., 2011).  
Forced to refocus their efforts in the midst of the economic recession, Ford, General  
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Table 2 Portfolio Outcomes of 3 Major Pharmaceutical Mergers 
Merger 
Year 
Acquired 
Firm 
Acquiring 
Firm 
Strategic Motive Outcome 
1995 Wellcome Glaxo Challenges of a 
changing industry 
environment patent 
expirations  
*Glaxo Wellcome 
experienced short-term 
savings but no long-term 
growth; Firm struggled to find 
replacements for its 
blockbuster drugs whose 
patents expired in the US 
2008 Wyeth PharmaZeta Streamline R&D 
capabilities 
**PharmaZeta’s R&D multi-
billion dollar cost savings 
resulted from elimination of 
research sites, programs, and 
scientists 
2014 Allergan Actavis Billion dollars 
R&D cost savings 
**Actavis cut R&D 
expenditures  
Source: *Mega Pharma Book, **Pharmaceutical-technology.com 
 
Motors, and Chrysler (known as the Big Three) all announced a complete change in product 
strategy at the beginning of 2009 (Kester et al., 2011).   The Big Three begin focusing on 
building portfolios of more fuel-efficient cars, following the lead of their top competitor, Toyota 
(Kester et al., 2011).  Portfolios need to be continuously reviewed and adjusted based on 
valuation outcomes and other portfolio criteria in order to remain competitive.   
 To aid in R&D portfolio decision making, firms rely on ranking, economic decision 
theory (single and multi-stage), portfolio optimization, cognitive modeling, and ad-hoc decision 
methods.  Although the literature focuses primarily on the use of these valuation methods, none 
of the methods explain the behaviors that drive the PfM decisions.  Additionally, these methods 
are often applied to a once-a-year decision event rather than an ongoing process (Martino, 1995).  
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As a result, many firms face reduced success due to their inability to make effective portfolio 
decisions (Kester et al., 2011).   
Mestre-Ferrandiz, Sussex, and Towse (as cited by Smith and Sonneblick, 2013) reported 
that pharma projects are extremely high risk (fewer than 10 percent make it to market), 
expensive (a single project can cost hundreds of millions of dollars), and have long time frames 
(typically 3-8 years).  Given these statistics, managers may feel that always making the right 
portfolio decisions are nearly impossible.  The unpredictability of the portfolio outcome may 
drive managers to make educated guesses based on past experiences with portfolio successes and 
failures.  Managers are faced with the challenge of thinking clearly in the midst of high demands 
and accountability for future failed projects.  The portfolio decisions of these pharma managers 
can ultimately lead to blockbuster drugs that generate high levels of return on investment or sunk 
costs that lead to severe declines in R&D productivity.  Managers anticipate the regrets and 
consequences of bad outcomes, while attempting to make the best portfolio selections. They seek 
out empirical methods that have the potential to delusively promise the achievement of high 
revenue growth goals.  Prior research has shown that adhering to PfM processes alone will not 
suffice for building a profitable portfolio. 
Many PfM processes are rushed, especially in the climate of consolidation where pharma 
mergers and takeover bids are often used as cost-saving measures (Lo, 2015).   These cost-saving 
measures include the streamlining of operations and termination of R&D activity (Lo, 2015).  
Managers who are responsible for PfM generally follow standardized processes.  These 
managers make PfM decisions as a result of investor demands.  These type decisions are often 
executed quickly, and the behaviors that drive such decisions may not be well understood.  
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During a merger, pharma R&D departments are the last to integrate, as a firm’s pipeline 
and patents are its most prized assets and are not revealed to competitors in case the deal falls 
through ("Hold you horses: M&A is about talent, not just pipelines," 2013).  It can take up nine 
months to merge departments, which is inevitably stressful and time-consuming for management 
and employees ("Hold you horses: M&A is about talent, not just pipelines," 2013).  During this 
critical period, no new projects are undertaken, and important decisions are made about the 
merged firm’s portfolio.  One way to explain how these decisions are made is by exploring the 
behaviors of the managers throughout the PfM process. 
I.2 Conceptual Framework 
This study will focus on the area of PfM.  The problem setting is the R&D departments 
within pharma firms.  Managers’ behaviors will be examined in the context of merger conditions.  
The conceptual framework for this research is displayed in Figure 1.  A summary of the research 
style components is shown in Exhibit A-1 of Appendix A.  Table 3 displays the definition of 
terms used in the study. 
The next section presents the literature findings on PfM and how it’s leveraged in 
collaboration with R&D activities within the pharma industry, the impact of M&A on PfM, and 
the presentation of the decision-based theory that will be applied to this research. Thereafter, the 
methodology is outlined.    
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Table 3 Definitions of Key Terms Used in This Study 
Term Definition 
Portfolio A collection of programs, projects and operations managed as a group. 
Portfolio 
Management 
A set of activities that allow a firm to select, develop, and commercialize a 
pipeline of new products aligned with the firm’s strategy that will enable it 
to continue to grow profitably over the long term. 
Project A pharmaceutical drug product within any given therapeutic area. 
Manager A portfolio management decision-maker within at firm who is responsible 
for making decisions regarding what drugs go into a portfolio. 
Merger and 
Acquisition 
A general term used to refer to the consolidation of companies.  This study 
involves horizontal pharmaceutical mergers. 
Merger 
Activities  
A set of activities that occur during M&A, such as pre- and post-merger 
portfolio selection. 
Phase I/Early 
Phase 
Development 
The first clinical trials in which the drug is administered to healthy human 
volunteers. 
Phase II Clinical trials in which the drug is administered to human patients with the 
disease by using the results of dosing studies from Phase I. 
Phase III/Late 
Stage 
Development 
This clinical trial phase includes large-scale clinical studies on humans 
with the disease. The FDA is involved and indicates benchmarks for 
giving their approval.  In addition to confirming the efficacy, these studies 
identify drug interactions, human demographics, and so forth. 
Clinical 
Study/Trial 
A rigorously controlled test of a new drug or a new invasive medical 
device on human subjects.  In the United States it is conducted under the 
direction of the FDA before being made available for general clinical use. 
 
  
9 
 
Figure 1 Conceptual Framework 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW  
II.1 Portfolio Management 
 
Definition.  A portfolio is a collection of programs, projects and operations managed as a 
group ("PMI," 2015). The components of a portfolio may not necessarily be interdependent or 
even related—but they are managed together as a group to achieve strategic objectives ("PMI," 
2015).  PfM practitioners rely on two main organizations for guidance on providing frameworks 
for managing portfolios, Project Management Institute (PMI) and the United Kingdom’s Office 
of Government Commerce (OGC).  These organizations provide methodologies and frameworks 
for managing portfolios, programs, and projects.   Firms have adopted various forms of these 
PfM frameworks, including the use of project evaluation and decision criteria control routines 
and other means to formalize their project PfM (Martinsuo, 2013).  The common objective of 
these organizations is to provide tools, techniques, and processes to aid in the delivery of projects 
aligned with its strategic goals.   Additionally, these organizations offer training and 
certifications for practitioners across many industries. The most common portfolio certification 
credentials are Portfolio Management Professional (PfMP) and Manager of Portfolio Practitioner 
(MoP), administered by PMI and OGC, respectively.   
PMI defines PfM as the centralized management of one or more portfolios, which 
includes identifying, prioritizing, authorizing, managing, and controlling projects, programs, and 
other related work to achieve specific strategic business objectives ("PMI," 2015).  United 
Kingdom’s Office of Government Commerce’s definition of PfM is a coordinated collection of 
strategic processes and decisions that together enable the most effective balance of 
organizational change and business as usual (Commerce, 2008).  For this study, PfM is defined 
as a set of activities that allow a firm to select, develop, and commercialize a pipeline of new 
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products aligned with a strategy that will enable it to continue to grow profitably over the long 
term (Kester et al., 2011).  Further, this study will focus on pharma PfM, as opposed to 
information technology and financial PfM. 
 Portfolio management spans across multiple industries and is one of the major business 
functions within an innovative firm.  If not managed proficiently and in line with the firm’s 
strategy, the negative impact of poor portfolio decisions can be significant (Kester et al., 2011).  
According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), successful PfM must be sufficiently detailed, 
interdisciplinary, consistent, and embedded in a practicable corporate process.  The process of 
developing a portfolio to deliver a firm’s or department’s strategy should take into account 
operational priorities as well as strategic priorities (Commerce, 2008).  
Portfolio Management Office.  The PfM office ideally reports to the head of R&D or the 
chief executive officer.  According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), the most effective 
organizational model is one in which the PfM function is closely linked to the strategy and 
project management entity within the firm, jointly reporting to either the chief executive office or 
another Board member that is not responsible for R&D.  According to OGC, the portfolio office 
should report directly to a main board director to ensure that it has sufficient influence over 
investment decisions (Commerce, 2008).  This reporting structure is critical because managers 
who are responsible for portfolios need to have buy-in and guidance from senior management 
and investors to provide strategies for making the PfM process effective.  The PMI Pulse study 
has identified five key drivers of effective PfM: senior management receptivity, competent 
portfolio governance, standardized metrics and criteria, consistency and logic of organizational 
strategic objectives, and mature project management office (PMI, 2012).   Effective PfM also 
includes metrics and criteria.  Figure 2 displays metrics used across industries as reported Bode-
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Greul and Nickisch (2008).  Project Management Institute’s Pulse of Profession In-Depth Report 
(PMI, 2012), stated that organizations that are effective in PfM had 62% of products meet or 
exceed return on investment (ROI). 
 
 
Figure 2 PfM Process in Fully Integrated Firms 
(Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008) 
 
Portfolio Management Process.  According to Bode-Greuel and Nickisch (2008), a 
typical PfM process includes the evaluation of development milestones and probabilities 
(decision-tree meetings).   The commercial analysis (marketing meetings) of individual projects 
is usually performed at the project team level, followed by a senior management review of the 
key assumptions across projects facilitates the establishment of valid and consistent assumptions 
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  Bode-Greul and Nickisch (2008) stated that project 
management is the predominant operative instrument for the execution of portfolio decisions.  A 
typical PfM process is displayed in Figure 3.   As capacity constraints may limit the operational 
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execution of portfolio decisions, effective communication, and interaction with functions 
facilitates the translation of project prioritization decisions into feasible actions (Bode-Greuel & 
Nickisch, 2008).  Bode-Greul (2008) identified four common tools that are applied to align 
project management with portfolio decisions: target product profile (TPP), a stage-gate decision 
process, timeline and budget management, and sales forecast aligned with TPP and development 
plan.  A TPP serves as a blueprint of the desired future product (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  
The stage-gate decision process is related to the major preclinical and clinical development 
milestones and is also a well-established principle in the pharma industry (Bode-Greuel & 
Nickisch, 2008).  At each stage-gate, it is decided whether the achieved results support 
continuation of development, and the project may be reprioritized depending on other projects 
competing for resources (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  Sales forecasting and financial 
project evaluation are undertaken to a variable extent and level of detail, depending on firms’ 
policies at which development stage quantitative analyses should commence (Bode-Greuel & 
Nickisch, 2008). 
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Figure 3 Commonly Applied PfM Metrics 
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008) 
 
II.2 R&D Portfolio Management  
 
Extending PfM to the R&D function adds complexity and the need for effective portfolio 
selection models.  Research and development managers often view PfM in terms of strategy and 
valuation. Wang and Hwang (2007) presented a simple fuzzy multi-criteria R&D portfolio 
decision model that represented project appraisals for each criterion as a fuzzy set and developed 
an algorithm to find non-dominated solutions.  Multifactorial analyses should be a routine part of 
any R&D portfolio assessment to account for all of the parameters that could impact a portfolio 
profile.  The most effective use of the PfM activity is not the value calculation at the end, but 
rather how information is effectively used to help develop, define, and carry out an overall 
business strategy (Tiggemann, Dworaczyk, & Sabel, 1998). 
 Tiggemann et al. (1998) presented four points that need to be considered when managing 
projects within an R&D portfolio: (1) probability-weighted net present value (expected NPV), 
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(2) long-term versus short-term balance of risk and strategic business needs, (3) balance of 
territory-specific versus global strategic business needs, and (4) organizational ability, capability, 
expertise, and resources.   These considerations should be included in pharma PfM criteria when 
trying to consolidate portfolios after a merger.  Another consideration is to recognize and 
properly deal with personal biases of managers (Tiggemann et al., 1998).  Biases could deter 
managers from effectively managing a pharma R&D portfolio. 
II.3 Pharmaceutical Portfolio Management  
 
Standard Approach to Portfolio Management.  According to Kester, Griffin, Hultink 
and Lauche (2011), pharmaceuticals are one of the most mature industries in PfM. This maturity 
comes from the fact that pharma firms may have an abundance of project alternatives at every 
level of the drug development process, where continuous decisions must be made for a constant 
pipeline of products.  An overview of the FDA drug development process is displayed in Table 
4.  Today, no major pharma firm is without some type of centralized PfM function with wide 
ranging responsibilities including strategy development, decision making and resource allocation 
(Grainger, 2014).   The impact of rising and falling productivity levels has led pharma firms to 
pay closer attention to their portfolios and look into the various ways in which they are managed.  
The pharma industry uses PfM to evaluate the commercial value and the risk structure of 
development projects (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).   Standard approaches to PfM in the 
biopharma industry involve sizing R&D portfolios as a function of expected revenues, and 
making inclusion–exclusion decisions on a compound-by-compound basis (Evans, Hinds, & 
Hammock, 2009).  Although most pharma firms have adopted PfM, the process for managing 
portfolios vary based upon firm size, culture, and corporate governance and structure.  Smith and 
Sonnenblick (2013) found the success of the new PfM process is dependent on having a strong 
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portfolio group with access to the project data, the ability to manipulate the data to answer what-
if questions, and access to executives who would listen to the insights gleaned from the analyses.  
PfM within the pharma industry involves the selection of products that are expected to deliver 
growth and sustain R&D operations.  Historically, the pharma industry has prided itself on 
investing more in R&D (as a percentage of revenues) than any other industry (LaMattina, 2011).  
The portfolio selection methods employed by firms such as the “BIG Three” are primarily 
focused on quantitative modeling methods.  The common denominator of these methods presents 
the selection decision as a rational, evidence-based rigorous comparison of numbers (Kester et 
al., 2011).  There is a general agreement in the pharma industry that the evaluation of projects 
entering full development after a successful proof of concept (PoC) should include quantitative 
financial parameters (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  Interestingly, firms relying solely on 
financial methods for project selection and decision making perform worse than other firms 
(Kester et al., 2011).  There are various portfolio methods that are utilized within pharma R&D.  
Common methods include: (a) discounted cash flow (DCF), (b) decision-tree analysis, (c) real 
options, (d) expert opinion, (e) sensitivity analysis, (f) internal rate of return (IRR), (g) pharma 
reviews, (h) stage-gates, (i) and net present value (NPV). 
Pharmaceutical Portfolio Valuation and Selection Models.  Project selection is one of 
the first and most critical activities in PfM (Kaiser, El Arbi, & Ahlemann, 2015).  Portfolio 
selection is a process characterized by uncertainty and changing information: new opportunities 
arise, multiple goals as well as strategic considerations are required, and interdependence among 
projects (either when competing for scarce resources or when synergies are achieved) exist, 
multiple decision-makers and locations (Kaiser et al., 2015).  Gupta and Wilemon (as cited by 
Blau, Pekny, Varma, & Bunch, 2004) stated that a portfolio must be selected in such a way that 
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the competition among drug candidates for limited resources does not result in unusually long 
average product development times and hence late commercialization.   
Deciding from a pool of available and competing projects is a complex decision (Kaiser 
et al., 2015).  Many managers mistakenly assume that the selection of good projects yield a 
profitable portfolio.  However, managers have to consider multiple project dimensions and 
intuitively decide how adding or removing a specific project would have an impact on the 
portfolio (Kaiser et al., 2015).  Smith and Sonnenblick (2013) stated the goal of PfM is not to 
pick which projects are the best but to pick the best set of projects to achieve the firm’s goals.  
The selection of a project can be determined at any interval during the drug development process 
as displayed in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 Overview of the Drug Development Process 
(Adapted from Dimasi, Hansen, and Grabowski (2003) as cited on www.fdareview.org) 
 
Preclinical Clinical Approval Market 
Toxicology Investigational 
New Drug 
Application 
Phase I Phase II Phase III New Drug 
Application 
Phase IV / 
Post market 
surveillance 
Safety Safety 
dosing 
efficacy 
Safety 
efficacy 
side effects 
Expenses   $15.2 
million 
$23.4 
million 
$86.5 
million 
Time   21.6 
months 
25.7 
months 
30.5 
months 
1 to 6 
years 
6 to 11 years 0.6 to 2 years 11 to 14 
years 
Overall probability of success 
   30% 14% 9% 8%    
Conditional probability of success 
   40% 75% 48% 64% 90%    
Note:  The line marked “Overall probability of success” is the unconditional probability of reaching a given stage.  
For example, 30 percent of drugs make it to phase I testing. The line marked “Conditional probability of success” 
shows the probability of advancing to the next stage of the process conditional on reaching a given stage.  For 
example, the probability of advancing to Phase III testing conditional on starting Phase II testing is 48 percent. 
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Bole-Greul and Nickisch (2008) indicated the following common set of criteria used to 
evaluate pharma projects for portfolio selection: (1) scoring around market size, attractiveness, 
and competitiveness, (2) high, medium, or low cost, either for research cost alone, or including 
development cost, (3) time to entry into clinical development / PoC / launch, expected time per 
milestone, (4) score against therapeutic area strategy, (5) scoring against TPP and milestone 
criteria.  Other criteria may include rankings of low, medium and high for: Innovation potential, 
specificity, efficacy, tolerability, appropriate early clinical PoC / availability of biomarkers, 
preclinical feasibility, clinical feasibility, degree of unmet medical need, competitiveness, 
number and categories of competitors, patent status, peak sale potential, and potential follow-on 
indications (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008). 
Discounted Cash Flow.  Chapman and Ward (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) reported that 
the earliest PfM techniques applied in the pharma industry were based on economic analysis.  
One of these methods, DCF, is defined as the present value of a company’s future cash flows.  
Discounted cash flow is calculated by dividing projected annual earnings over an extended 
period by an appropriate discount rate, which is the weighted cost of raising capital by issuing 
debt or equity ("Discounted cash flow," 2011).  According to Krishnan and Ulrich (as cited by 
Blau et al., 2004) the DCF method remains the most commonly used valuation method.  
However, Poh, Ang, and Bai (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) argued that DCF is based on expected 
values of uncertain parameters and is unable to generate quantitative details about the risk 
associated with a given drug candidate. 
Decision-tree Analysis.  Decision tree analysis is an effective tool used to illustrate R&D 
decision points, the probabilities of uncertain outcomes at each milestone, and potentially 
resulting decision options (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).   Sharpe and Keelin (as cited by 
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Blau et al., 2004) indicated that decision trees allow management to undertake complex resource 
allocation decisions among competing drug candidates with full consideration to the possibilities 
of drug failures.  Decision trees serve as a communication tool for FM, project management and 
line functions (Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  Ding and Eliashberg (as cited by Blau et al., 
2004) reported that the decision tree method also has addressed PfM issues such as how many 
projects to pursue and how many projects to terminate. 
Real Options.  The real options approach is used in capital market theory to determine 
valuation of risky R&D projects (Wang & Hwang, 2007).  Real options are defined as the 
situation in which an investor can choose between two different investments, where both choices 
are tangible assets ("Real Options," 2011).  The first reported practical use of a portfolio 
selection strategy is the application of the real options pricing valuation model presented above 
by Merck and Co. (Hartmann & Hassan, 2006).  The results of a study reported by Hartmann and 
Hassan (2006) indicate that real options pricing, despite its valuation models, have not seen a 
high rate of adoption within the pharma industry.    This lack of adoption may be attributed to a 
finding by Copeland and Antikarov (as cited by Blau et. al., 2004) that in practice, the real 
options method has been used effectively only to evaluate single projects.  In pharma, multiple 
projects across various therapeutic areas are evaluated simultaneously, and final selections form 
a portfolio. 
Expert Opinion and Sensitivity Analysis.  Research shows that pharma portfolio 
managers rely heavily on expert opinion and in-house calculations obtained by sensitivity and 
scenario analysis (Hartmann & Hassan, 2006).   Sensitivity and scenario analysis involve 
changing one or more of the values supplied for the payoffs, costs, and probabilities, then 
rerunning the procedure for selecting optimum portfolio (Martino, 1995).  Expert opinion is 
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defined as a statement from a specialist on a particular subject. These opinions could be based on 
past and present experiences of subject matter experts.  
Internal Rate of Return and Net Present Value.  For any given portfolio, there is a 
planning horizon for the time in which the portfolio is being considered, a budget for the total 
amount of money available for the selected projects and minimum performance requirements 
such as a minimum IRR or a minimum NPV (Kaiser et al., 2015).   Internal rate of return is 
defined as the discount rate at which the cash inflow on an investment equals its cash outflow 
("NPV," 2011).  Net present value is defined as the present value of the expected future cash 
flows minus the cost ("NPV," 2011).   In most pharma portfolio processes, projects are ranked 
according to their NPV.  This method is the most understood by investors, managers and finance 
teams and is commonly used a decision-making component.  Projects with a positive NPV are 
favored over those with negative NPVs.  Evans et al. (2009) identified two crucial inadequacies 
of the NPV approach when used a sole determination: (1) it fails to distinguish between projects 
offering comparable returns but different levels of risk, and (2) it fails to provide a cumulative 
measure of risk and returns at the whole-portfolio level.  Tiggemann et al. (1998) corroborated 
this notion by stating that a priority ranking of R&D projects from the highest down to the lowest 
probability weighted NPV will fail.  Therefore, managers are not holistically informed to make a 
critical portfolio decision using NPV alone. 
Reviews and Stage-Gates.  Once a portfolio has been defined, portfolio reviews are 
conducted once or twice a year.  Portfolio reviews are defined as qualitative and quantitative 
evaluations consisting of parameters such as:  strategic fit, degree of innovation, NPV and 
expected value uptake, project productivity, sales, probability of launch, time to launch, and cost 
(Bode-Greuel & Nickisch, 2008).  Pharma R&D portfolio reviews are extensive and time-
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consuming, as they require careful consideration of scientific issues such as efficacy and safety 
data for each product, as well as commercial issues such as potential duplication and strategic 
directions of the merged firm (LaMattina, 2011).   These reviews are sometimes rushed as a 
result of approaching deadlines and environmental conditions.  Portfolio reviews are helpful 
because they usually involve many levels of management and key decision-makers.  According 
to Bode-Greul and Nickisch (2008), portfolio decisions are best achieved in an interactive way 
because individual opinions and attitudes become transparent, paving the way for consensus and 
compromise increasing the chance that decisions are respected and translated into action on the 
operational level. 
A stage-gate is defined as a phased project management approach that produces fact-
based funding decisions based on a set of defined evaluation criteria.  According to O’Connor 
(1994) (as cited by Blau et al., 2004), the stage-gate process appears mainly focused on tactical 
decisions such as regulating the flow of work in the pipeline rather than on strategic decisions 
such as project selection and sequencing. 
II.4 Pharmaceutical Portfolio Management and Post-Merger Integration 
 
M&A Objectives.  Richey, Kiessling, Tokman, & Dalela (2008) (as cited by Oh, Peters, 
& Johnston, 2014) state that M&As have been used as a market growth strategy.  Still today, 
firms continue to pursue M&As with the expectation of significant growth. Table 5 presents 20 
goals or objectives  for M&As derived from Kitching 167; Howell, 1970, Steiner, 1975 (as cited 
by Walter and Barney, 1990).    The most common goals or objectives pharma managers align 
with items 2, 7, 9, 10, 11 and 20 of Table 5.  These objectives aim to enhance capabilities, 
improve efficiencies, penetrate new markets, utilize talent, and integrate technologies of the 
acquired firm.  Portfolio management objectives are to divest poor-performing drugs.  Prior 
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research has shown the goal to attain immediate growth is realized.  However, the merged entity 
eventually suffers and experience lower performance.   
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Table 5 Managerial Goals of M&A 
Walter and Barney (1990) 
 
Item Goal 
1 Promote visibility with investors, bankers, or governments, with an eye to subtle 
benefits later. 
2 Accelerate growth or reduce risks and costs in a particular industry in which the 
acquiring company has a strength such as executive wisdom. 
3 Utilize interlocking and mutually stimulating(synergistic) qualities of the acquired 
company vis-a-vis  the acquiring company. 
4 Attain improved competitiveness inherent in holding a sizeable market share or 
important market position. 
5 Utilize financial strengths of the acquired company such as foreign tax credits or 
borrowing capacity. 
6 Gain complementary financial features such as those that balance earnings 
cyclicality. 
7 Reduce risks and costs of diversifying products and services delivered to customers 
within an industry. 
8 Utilize the acquiring company's expertise in marketing, production, or other areas 
within the acquired company. 
9 Divest poor-performing elements of the otherwise undervalued acquired company, 
in portfolio management style. 
10 Improve efficiencies and reduce risk in the supply of specific goods and/or services 
to the acquiring company. 
11 Penetrate new markets by utilizing the acquired company's marketing capacities. 
12 Improve economies of scale by utilizing the acquired company's distributional 
capacities to absorb expanded output. 
13 Gain valuable or potentially valuable assets with the cash flow or other financial 
strengths of the acquiring firm. 
14 Broaden the customer base for existing goods and services of the acquiring 
company. 
15 Create economies of scale by relevant capacity expansion. 
16 Reduce risks and costs of entering a new industry. 
17 Expand capacity at less cost than assembling new facilities, equipment, and/or 
physical assets. 
18 Fulfill the personal ambitions, vision, or some particular goal of the acquiring 
company's chief executive. 
19 Pursue opportunities to sell stock at a profit by such acts as pressing management of 
the acquired firm for improved earnings. 
20 Utilize the acquired company's personnel, skills, or technology in other operations 
of the acquiring company. 
 
 
M&A Process and Impact on Firm.  M&A activity is likely to occur when one firm is 
performing low and another firm is seeking market expansion (Campbell, Sirmon, & Schijven, 
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2016).  In this scenario, the high performing firm would acquire the low performing firm.  These 
acquiring firms can acquire same and smaller size firms.  Investors perceive the acquiring firm as 
having sufficient capital to maximize the acquisition.  According to Campbell et al. (2016), 
investors pursue acquisitions when the acquiring firm is strategically and organizationally fit, 
have strong performance, and leverage experience.  They influence board members and the 
executive team to acquire the low-performing firms.  The traditional steps of the acquisition 
process are shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 Traditional view of the acquisition process 
Adapted from Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991) (as cited by Angwin, Paroutis, & Connell, 2015) 
 
 The low-performing firms are usually acquired by larger firms.  However, larger firms 
can also acquire firms of equal size.  Cartwright and Cooper, 1993 (as cited by Oh et al., 2014) 
state that smaller firms are known to adopt the changes that are introduced by the larger 
acquiring firm.  The acquiring and acquired firms form a perception about that the culture of the 
merged entity, even before the merger takes place (Cartwright and Cooper, 1993 as cited by Oh 
et al., 2014).   In a quantitative study conducted by Oh et al. (2014), it was discovered that post-
merger performance deterioration due to the conflict in organizational cultures is greater in 
acquisitions involving larger target firms than in acquisitions of smaller target firms. 
Phase 1:  
Strategic 
Objective
Phase 2:  
Searching and 
Screening
Phase 3:  
Strategic 
Evaluation
Phase 4:  
Financial 
Evaluation
Phase 5:  
Negotiation
Phase 6:  
Agreement
Phase 7:  
Integration
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 Research from the Harvard Business School found that 86% of M&A failed to achieve 
their goals and expectations (Bart & Schreiber, 2013).  Until strategies are set forth and executed 
to address the challenges with culture, talent retention, strategy alignment and integration, this 
declining trend may continue.   
 
Post-Merger Integration.  According to Shrivastava (1986), the ability to integrate two 
entities into one is a major concern for most firms.  Technologies, procedures, accounting 
systems, and physical assets are among the first and easiest to be integrated.  Studies conducted 
by Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, & Weber, 1992 and Kusewitt, 1985 (as cited by Campbell, 
2016 ) reveal that the closer the firms are in size, the higher the likelihood that they will face 
integration difficulties.   In many cases, the acquiring and the acquired firms are large, which 
further complicates mergers.  
Culture is one of the hardest components to integrate.  Oh et al., (2014) indicate that 
conflict in firm cultures is only temporarily influential in affecting post-merger performance, and 
executing the right strategy to gain merger synergies could make integration more successful. 
Schweizer and Patzelt (2012) emphasize the importance of human elements in the 
integration process.  Increased turnover among key R&D personnel and key managers following 
an acquisition results in the loss of valuable knowledge and expertise which limits knowledge 
transfer (Canella & Hambrick, 1993; Ranft & Lord, 2000 as cited by Schweizer and Patzelt, 
2012).   McMullen & Shepherd, 2006; Podolny (1994) drew on the behavioral decision-making 
perspective that employees from acquired firms leave to avoid the substantial uncertainties as a 
result of the integration (as cited by Schweizer and Patzelt, 2012). 
Shrivastava (1986) estimated that almost half to two thirds of all mergers fail as a result 
of faulty integration.  Decades of failed mergers have been documented in the literature.  In 
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1981, Exxon Inc. bought Reliance Electric Firm for $1.2 billion but failed as a result of poor 
integration (Shrivastava, 1986).  
Other factors that complicate the post-merger integration of firms are the diverse motives 
behind these mergers, the diverse strategies used to acquire firms, and complex technologies and 
production systems that need to be integrated after the merger (Shrivastava, 1986).  Managerial 
motives for mergers vary from the creation of financial value for stockholders to the almost 
altruistic, friendly, saving gesture on the part of the acquiring firm (Shrivastava, 1986). 
 Schrivastava (1986) identified three types of post-merger integrations: (1) procedural 
integration, (2) physical integration, and (3) managerial and sociocultural integration.  Since one 
of the contexts of this study is R&D, we will focus on physical integration.  If the post-
integration process is badly managed, an acquisition can imply a potential disruption in the 
established routines of the merging firm and in its newly acquired component, and thereby even 
reduce R&D productivity (Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone, & Veugelers, 2005).  Physical 
integration involves the consolidation of product lines, production technologies, R&D projects, 
plant and equipment, and real estate assets (Shrivastava, 1986).  The integration of these 
components is costly, labor intensive and time-consuming and must be managed properly. 
Product line integration involves the evaluation and assessment of existing products and its 
strategic alignment with that of the acquirer.  A decision will be made to either terminate or 
divest a product line.  Integration of production technologies involve screening and divesting 
redundant production facilities or transferring production systems across divisional and firm 
boundaries, as well as integrating existing plants and equipment (Shrivastava, 1986).  Mergers 
may result in the relocation of plant and equipment in efforts to reduce production costs, 
inventory holding costs, and the cost of transporting goods to markets (Shrivastava, 1986).  The 
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integration of immovable real estate assets primarily involves revaluation of properties and their 
allocation to appropriate functions (Shrivastava, 1986).  Pre-merger analysis and valuation of 
real estate assets very often do not take into account the rapid escalation of property prices, 
especially properties located in urban areas, which could significantly negatively impact stock 
prices of the merged company (Shrivastava, 1986).  
 Increased financial leverage from M&A activities affects the financing of R&D activities 
by increasing the opportunity cost of funds allocated to R&D, leading to elimination of R&D 
projects and/or a higher risk-aversion in R&D project selection (Cassiman et al., 2005).  
According to Cassiman et al. (2005), M&A activity can yield favorable results when (1) firms 
are involved in M&As for technology sourcing purposes; (2) the M&A integration process is 
effectively managed; (3) firms are able to retain key people, and, (4) firms have a strong own 
internal know-how base, which allows to better evaluate potential targets and to realize synergies 
from combining know-how from the target and acquiring firm.   
Big pharma firms have demonstrated that, despite the inevitable disruption caused by the 
mergers, they end up better off (Bershidsky, 2014).  A report by the management consulting firm 
McKinsey & Co. found that of the 11 pharma firms that have remained in the global Top-20 
since 1995, seven have made acquisitions worth more than $10 billion each (Bershidsky, 2014).  
Median excess returns for megamergers were positive, showing returns 5 percent above the 
industry index two years after a deal's announcement (Bershidsky, 2014).   Despite these 
growths, prior research shows that R&D portfolios suffer from budget cuts and a decline in 
investments.  Undergoing one merger will have a substantial negative impact on the momentum 
of research portfolios, but enduring this multiple times can be crippling (LaMattina, 2011).  
According to LaMattina (2011), after a major pharma merger, the rate of progress of compounds 
  
28 
in the development pipeline seems to decrease.  For example, comparing data from 
PharmaZeta’s pipeline updates before the Wyeth merger in February 2008 and in February 2011, 
40% of the compounds (not including those from Wyeth) had been in Phase II development for 
more than three years, which is below the industry average (LaMattina, 2011).  To our 
knowledge, there is no data that show the behaviors of managers responsible for selecting a 
portfolio that have negatively impacted R&D after a merger.  The next section will discuss the 
theory that will be used to analyze the behaviors demonstrated by managers throughout the PfM 
process. 
 
II.5 Theory of Narrative Thought   
 
Origin and Definition.  Theory of Narrative Thought (TNT) is a theory from the field of 
naturalistic decision making (Rutten, Dorée, & Halman, 2013).  The central goal in the field of 
naturalistic decision-making research is to understand how people actually make decisions in 
real-world settings (Rutten et al., 2013).  The naturalistic decision framework was initiated in 
1989 in a conference in Dayton, Ohio, sponsored by the Army Research Institute (Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001).  According to Lipshitz et al (2001), the original definition 
emphasized the shaping features of the contexts in which many decisions of interest were made: 
ill-structured problems, uncertainty, dynamic environments, shifting, ill-defined, or competing 
goals, multiple event-feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple players, and 
organizational settings, where expertise was included as a secondary factor.  This approach 
would appear to fit the M&A context based on the shaping features of that context. 
  Classical approaches to decision making, such as Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis 
(MAUA) and Decision Analysis, prescribe analytical and systematic methods to weigh evidence 
and select an optimal course of action (Klein, 2008).  Other decision-making theories are 
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economic based and lack the cognitive elements that help explain decisions made in real-world 
settings using memory from past and present experiences.  Hence, TNT was chosen to help 
answer our research question and provide rich insights into the behaviors that drive portfolio 
decisions during post-merger PfM processes.   The antecedents of TNT are described in Exhibit 
A-2 of Appendix A.  These theories help derive the core constructs of TNT, which include: 
narratives, forecasts, decisions and actions.  These constructs explain how the cognitive abilities: 
memory, perception, imagination, and decision making shape R&D portfolio management 
decisions in the aftermath of a pharma merger. 
TNT Concepts.  Theory of Narrative Thought’s view of decision making is built on the 
notion that decision-makers’ narratives play a key role in decision making (Rutten et al., 2013).  
Decision-makers’ narratives are the stories they tell themselves (both consciously and 
unconsciously) about what happened in the past and what is happening in the present 
(perception).  It is a rich mixture of memories and cognitive images that enable a person to 
forecast what will happen in the future (Rutten et al., 2013).  When a person decides that all or 
part of the forecasted future is undesirable, they make further decisions about what actions to 
take to ensure the arrival of the actual future is desirable. A comprehensive list of constructs for 
TNT is displayed and defined in Table 6. 
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Table 6 TNT Constructs 
Beach (2010) 
 
Construct Definition 
Narratives A rich mixture of memories, visual, auditory, and other cognitive 
images, all laced together by emotions to form a mixture that far 
surpasses mere words and visual images in their ability to capture 
context and meaning.  Narratives are the stories that we tell ourselves 
and what we are told by others. 
Action 
Forecast 
An educated guess about how the future might unfold if you make an 
effort to intervene or change it. 
Decisions The way you shape the future to conform to your values. 
Resultant 
Action 
The outcome of an implemented plan that conforms to your values and 
desired future.  
Imagination The ability to use information about the past and present to forecast the 
future. 
Memory The ability to retain, retrieve, and use information about the past. 
Narrative 
Thought 
The proposition that narratives are the vehicle for cognitively 
constructing the past, present and future is the theory of narrative 
thought. 
Rules Explicit steps used for manipulating both cognitive and physical events 
so that your actions achieve their desired ends. 
Values Ethics, and your ideas of equity, justice, solidarity, stewardship, truth, 
beauty, and goodness, together with your moral, civic, and religious 
precepts and the responsibilities you assume in the course of 
performing your daily duties and engaging in social interactions. 
Decision 
Making 
The ability to detect that a forecasted future is undesirable, to select 
actions that will promote a desirable future, and to monitor the actions 
progress toward achieving the alternative future. 
Plan A sequence of potential actions designed to influence crucial junctures 
in the unfolding course of events in order to transform what you 
otherwise forecast to be an undesirable future into a desirable future. 
Desired Future The alternative future that your intervention is designed to achieve. 
 
Application of TNT.  The overarching concept of TNT is that human beings take charge 
of their situations by understanding how the future derives from the past and present, and using 
that knowledge to guide actions aimed at making the future more desirable than it might 
otherwise be (Beach, 2010).  A theoretical model of TNT is displayed in Figure 5.  The 
constructs of TNT are being used in this study to explain the behaviors that drive managers to 
make R&D portfolio management decisions after a pharma merger.   We chose TNT because its 
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constructs help explain how conscious, unconscious, and intuitive decisions are formed and 
organized during the PfM process. The theoretical framework for this study is illustrated in 
Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 5 TNT Model 
(Derived from Beach, 2010) 
 
First, we determined if professional and personal experiences, both past and present, 
shape the decisions of leaders faced with the responsibility of choosing the right projects to grow 
and sustain the R&D pipeline while conforming to the complexities of organization disruption 
caused by M&A.  Consistent with the logic of the theoretical model, we explored how these 
professional and personal experiences, or others, influenced portfolio decisions.   We discovered 
how the portfolio is managed until an attractive and promising portfolio is attained. 
Second, the naturalistic nature of TNT allowed us to assess the thought processes of 
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leaders in this setting.  The context is the R&D departments that encompass the combined drug 
portfolio of at least two merged entities.  The condition of the R&D department post-merger is 
delicate and uncertain, and leaders are faced with the responsibility of making critical decisions.  
The department at the merged state is complex, and is met with an abundance of drugs that may 
have conflicting implications, development constraints, and unexpected costs.  Continuing with 
the logic of theoretical model, the future state of the portfolio is envisioned, and strategic plans 
are composed from the minds of the decision-makers.  These decision-makers combined current 
sensory and memory information to produce an image of the merged firm’s portfolio condition.  
If the current condition of the portfolio was not attractive, decision-makers revised the strategic 
plans as new knowledge is discovered and transform these plans into actions.  This process 
repeated until the desired state of the portfolio met the standards (rules) of a revenue-generating 
pipeline. 
Third, TNT enabled us to explore the behaviors of managers while making PfM 
decisions.  To initiate the post-merger portfolio process, initial discussions about integrating the 
R&D organizations occur and the initial focus is on Phase III programs, followed by mid-stage 
candidates, with the early-stage discovery programs handled last (LaMattina, 2011).  These 
reviews are extensive and time-consuming, as they require careful consideration of scientific 
issues, such as efficacy and safety data for each program, as well as commercial issues such as 
potential duplication and strategic directions of the merged firm (LaMattina, 2011).  This 
thinking, as described by TNT, is comprised of the decision-makers’ narratives, forecasted 
actions, and rules.  Narratives are a mixture of memories (visual, auditory, and other cognitive 
images), all laced together by emotions to form a mixture that far surpasses mere words and 
visual images in their ability to capture context and meaning (Beach, 2010).  Narratives are the 
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vehicle for cognitively constructing the past, present, and future (Beach, 2010).  Rules tell the 
decision-maker what to expect as a result of something he or she does, and what to expect as a 
result of actions by other people and the natural environment (Rutten et al., 2013).  These rules 
are then applied to produce an action based on forecasts (or predictions) of what the future 
should look like.  Drawing on the process model of the theory, our notion is that narratives of 
decision-makers comprised of experiences from former post-merger R&D portfolio failures, 
their ideas of what can be done today to prevent future failures, and how they envision the 
success of selecting the right portfolio to contribute to the success of the firm as well as 
themselves. 
 
 
Figure 6 Theoretical Framework 
(Derived from Beach (2010) 
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II.6 Literature Gap  
 
According to Lamattina (2011), leaders of organizations who have completed multiple 
mergers may express the view: “We’ve done this before, and we know how to do it.”   However, 
prior literature reveals that the complexities of post-merger integration, coupled with the 
turbulence of R&D portfolio disruptions, ultimately lead to negative impacts to the R&D 
pipeline.  Much of the PfM literature is based on a rational idea of how the involved managers 
make decisions based mainly on financial data to optimize resulting changes in the portfolio.   A 
summary of the prior findings on PfM in practice, PfM and post-merger integration, R&D PfM 
and Pharma PfM in the literature are displayed in Tables 7, 8, 9 and 10, respectively.  Henriksen 
and Traynor (as cited by by Martinsuo, 2013) found that despite the project PfM frameworks and 
their well-intended portfolio analyses and investment optimizations during portfolio planning, 
project PfM models alone don’t allow for optimum PfM decisions.  A six-year case study 
conducted by Smith and Sonneblick (2013) demonstrated that most managers felt that the PfM 
process was extremely political, and projects were selected based upon how well its proponents 
lobbied them in meetings.  Despite these discoveries, the literature reveals that financial methods 
are still the most popular models for PfM.  The supporting theories for these methods are 
economic-based, and provide little knowledge about the behaviors that drive the PfM decisions 
that are made after M&A.  Linton, Walsh, and Morabito (as cited by Blau et al., 2004) revealed 
that economic analysis methods have been criticized for their rigid focus on single criteria 
decision making versus more realistic multiple criteria decision making. 
Our study addresses the literature gap surrounding the lack of research on the actual 
behaviors that drive PfM decisions after a pharma merger.  According to Martinsuo (2013), there 
is a lack of awareness of what managers actually do during the PfM process and the unique 
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conditions in which portfolios are managed are not fully known.   Elonen and Artto (as cited by 
Martinsuo, 2013) revealed that portfolio managers grant an insufficient amount of attention to 
portfolio activities.  Similarly, Cassiman et al. (2005) states that managerial time and effort spent 
on managing M&A’s ex post may imply reduced attention to R&D projects.  Our findings 
provide insights into the behaviors that drive portfolio managers’ decisions, and help improve the 
quality of post-merger R&D PfM processes.  We reveal the unspoken objectives of managers 
that influence portfolio decisions.  This research addresses the gap in prior literature by applying 
a qualitative, multiple-case study research approach to understanding portfolio managers’ 
behaviors while making PfM decisions during a merger.   
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Table 7 Summary of recent empirical research on PPM in practice 
(Adapted from Martinsuo, 2013)  
Reference  Data and 
methodology  
Key findings  Emerging issues/new gaps  
Aaltonen 
(2010)  
Historical document-
based event 
sequence study in a 
single 
pharmaceutical firm  
Variation, selection and 
retention in the evolution of 
a portfolio. Co-selection and 
path dependency in portfolio 
decision making 
Causalities and managers' 
intentions and actions in 
PPM require further 
research 
Blichfeldt 
and Eskerod  
(2008)  
Qualitative 
interview-based 
study with 30 firms 
in different 
industries  
Projects/activities outside of 
the official portfolio 
consume and compete for 
resources, which affects 
PPM performance 
Official PPM differs from 
the actual practice of PPM. 
Negligence of the actual 
reality endangers PPM 
success 
Blomquist 
and Müller 
(2006)  
Multi-method study: 
interviews and 
questionnaire  
Project type explains certain 
middle managers' roles in 
PPM 
Need to take into account 
project type in selecting 
PfM practices  
Christiansen 
and Varnes 
(2008)  
Qualitative, multi-
method single-case  
study in one 
organization  
Managers do not follow the 
rules agreed for PPM in their 
decision making, but they 
observe others, negotiate and 
debate, and learn 
Portfolio decision making as 
a negotiation and learning 
process, despite the 
existence of formal rules. 
Also the business context/ 
situation matters 
Kester et al. 
(2009)  
Qualitative interview 
study in 11 
multinational firms  
Three genres of portfolio 
decision making: formalist-
reactive, intuitive and 
integrative 
Attention needs to be paid 
on how people make 
decisions in practice. More 
empirical research is needed 
Kester et al. 
(2011)  
Qualitative multiple-
case study, four 
firms in different 
industries  
Decision making both as 
rational, political and 
intuitive 
Power and opinion-based 
decision making, besides 
evidence based. The model 
to be tested further  
Killen et al., 
(2008b)  
Questionnaire survey  
 
Selected PPM practices are 
associated with better PPM 
performance 
In-depth studies are needed 
to further develop 
frameworks of how PPM 
practice and performance 
are linked 
Martinsuo 
and 
Lehtonen 
(2007)  
Questionnaire survey  
 
Goal setting, information 
availability and systematic 
decision making has a 
significant effect on PPM 
success  
What project managers do 
have implications on the 
portfolio level too 
McNally et 
al. (2009)  
Qualitative 
embedded single 
case study  
Managers' dispositional 
traits are proposed to be 
associated with project 
portfolio  
Managers' analytic cognitive 
style, ambiguity tolerance 
and leadership style  
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Table 8 Summary of recent research on portfolio management and post-merger integration 
Author Research 
Method 
Research Objective Contribution 
Getz, 
Zuckerman, 
DiMasi, and 
Kaitin (2009) 
Quantitative Drug development 
portfolio and spending 
practices after Mergers 
and acquisitions 
Provided insights into better 
forecasting of drug 
development productivity and 
resource requirements 
following M&A transactions  
Shibayama, 
Tanikawa, and 
Kimura 
(2011) 
Qualitative New perspectives for the 
management of M&A 
process:  A merger case 
of a Japanese 
pharmaceutical 
company 
Showed that engagement and 
non-rapid rationalization of 
the workforce can slow the 
execution of the merger 
process and delay efficiency 
savings, and consistently drive 
the merger process and place 
the merged firm on a solid 
foundation with strong 
commitment from all levels 
Demirbag, 
Ng, and 
Tatoglu 
(2007) 
Quantitative Performance of M&A in 
the pharmaceutical 
industry:  A comparative 
perspective 
Revealed that no value 
creation was realized in terms 
of research productivity, 
return on investment, and 
profit margin 
 
 
Table 9 Summary of key recent research on R&D portfolio management 
Author Research 
Method 
Research Objective Contribution 
Van Bekkum, 
Pennings, and 
Smit (2009) 
Quantitative A real options 
perspective on R&D 
portfolio diversification 
Contributed to real options 
theory by demonstrating the 
correlation between 
conditional and unconditional 
project and portfolio risk 
Rutten, Doree, 
Halman 
(2013) 
Qualitative Exploring the value of a 
novel decision-making 
theory in understanding 
R&D progress 
decisions 
Applied decision-making 
theory to explain how 
managers progress decisions 
are made in the context of the 
sunk costs principle  
Menke (2013) Benchmark 
Study 
Making R&D portfolio 
management more 
effective 
Provided recommendations on 
how to improve portfolio 
management processes to 
make them more effective 
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Table 10 Summary of key recent research on pharmaceutical portfolio management 
Author Research 
Method 
Research Objective Contribution 
Bode-Greul, 
Nickisch 
(2008) 
Qualitative Value-driven project and 
portfolio management in 
the pharmaceutical industry: 
Drug discovery versus drug 
Development -
Commonalities 
and differences in portfolio 
management practice 
Described commonalities 
and differences of the 
portfolio management 
process in R&D and 
provides 
recommendations for 
effective portfolio 
management 
Blau, Pekny, 
Varma, Bunch 
(2004) 
Quantitative Managing a portfolio of 
interdependent new product 
candidates in the 
pharmaceutical industry 
Proposes a computational 
portfolio management 
approach that selects a 
sequence of projects 
Smith and 
Sonnenblick 
(2013) 
Qualitative From budget-based to 
strategy-based portfolio 
management: A six-year 
case study 
Provided insight into how 
a pharmaceutical 
company managed their 
portfolio and evolved 
involved into a holistic 
approach to portfolio 
management 
 
II.7 Research Objective 
 
Research Question.  Most literature takes a somewhat methodological perspective on PfM, 
focusing on algorithms for optimizing portfolios and the general effectiveness of PfM (Kaiser et 
al., 2015).  In this study, we take a different approach.  We are less concerned about ideas of how 
portfolios are managed optimally.  These ideas are financially and rationally focused and are 
prescriptive for how managers should behave.   We are more concerned about researching how 
managers actually behave during the PfM process after a pharma merger.  We used TNT to look 
into the cognition of how they carried out PfM processes.   We also used TNT to explore the role 
of four universal human cognitive abilities:  memory, perception, imagination, and decision 
making, and to learn how these abilities translate into narratives that influence the decisions of 
leaders within the pharma industry to help answer the following research question: How do 
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pharma R&D managers make portfolio decisions during a merger?  We applied this narrative-
based decision theory to help managers better understand how portfolio decision-makers may use 
past and present experiences to forecast the future and transform these strategic plans into actions 
that lead to optimum portfolio selections.  These actions, especially when integrated with any of 
the common valuation models used for portfolio selection, may lead to better decision making 
that supports both short and long-term R&D growth.   We provided insight for firms to learn 
what actually drive the behaviors of the managers that make portfolio decisions. 
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III METHODOLOGY  
III.1 Research Design 
 
The goal of this research was to discover how portfolio decisions are shaped by the 
behaviors of managers within the pharma industry during a merger.  A qualitative multiple-case 
study approach was used for this study since contextual conditions are important, and the 
boundaries between a contemporary phenomenon in its real-world context were not clear (Yin, 
2014).   This approach was appropriate since this research aimed to determine what managers 
say they think and how they say they feel (Bellenger, Bernhardt, & Goldstucker, 1976).  The unit 
of analysis is the R&D unit with various functional areas within small to large-sized firms within 
pharma industry.   The unit of observation is the individual managers.   
Process theory was utilized since the goal was to describe and explain the temporal 
sequence of events involved in the PfM decision-making process throughout a merger.  An 
exploratory research approach was taken to discover the relevant events that might apply in other 
similar situations (Myers, 2009). 
This research relies on an interpretive epistemology, since the goal was to understand 
phenomena through meanings that people assign to them (Myers, 2009).  We interpreted 
managers’ perspectives of their behaviors that drove portfolio decisions during a merger. 
III.2 Research Method 
 
A multiple case type 3 holistic study design using literal replication was used since 
similar results were predicted (Yin, 2014).  Although portfolio decisions differed between firms, 
the resultant actions were similar, in that managers’ behaviors shaped their portfolio decisions.  
Cases were selected based on Pettigrew guidelines (Pettigrew, 1990).  Additionally, managers 
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were situated within the pharma industry and had encountered M&A within R&D functions.  A 
case study report was constructed using a linear-analytic structure consistent with (Yin, 2014). 
This empirical inquiry relied on multiple sources of evidence to increase confidence in 
the accuracy of the cases (Yin, 2014).  Data was collected using interviews, financial reports, the 
FDA website, and direct observation.  Interviewees consisted of portfolio executives and 
managers within R&D.  In-depth semi-structured interviews were used to encourage participants 
to talk freely and to describe how they make portfolio decisions during a merger (Bellenger et 
al., 1976).    Stebbins (as cited by Bellenger et al., 1976) defines the in-depth interview as an 
occasion for the subject to explore, clarify, and give consistency to his feelings in a way he never 
has had reason to do.  Due to the confidential nature of a portfolio manager’s decisions, in-depth 
interviews served as the most appropriate technique for this research to allow participants to 
express openly their experiences and feelings while making portfolio decisions. 
Interviews were recorded using using an Olympus digital recorder (Model VN-722PC).  
Transcription software was used to transcribe interviews for each case. Field notes were captured 
during and after each case interaction. 
A case study database was created to compile triangulated data.  Interviews were 
transcribed and imported into a computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software that was 
used to arrange the narrative and numeric data to increase the reliability of the case studies (Yin, 
2014).  Case site and informant identities are not revealed, as anonymity was requested by all 
informants.  
 
Case Selection.  Exhibit C-1 of Appendix C outlines the criteria that were used for case 
selection in this study. Managers from firms were selected based on published M&A activities 
within the last 20 years.  Additionally, all managers’ firms reside within the pharma industry.  A 
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total of eight managers from acquiring firms were chosen based on informants’ portfolio 
decision making experiences during merger activities within the firm. There are a total of five 
managers from the acquired firms.   There are a total of three mid-sized and five large-sized 
acquiring firms.   There are a total of two small-sized, three mid-sized, and four large-sized 
acquired firms.  Table 11 details the acquiring firms’ acquisitions, including the size of both the 
acquiring and acquired firm, merger time period and cost range of acquisition.  All of the 
acquiring firms in this study operate within the pharma space and maintain a portfolio of R&D 
products.  At the time of this study, all acquisitions had been completed, and post-merger 
activities were underway.   All acquiring firms still served as the parent company of all of its 
subsidiaries and had not been acquired by a larger pharma firm.   Mergers and acquisitions for 
this study took place between 1995 and 2015.  Acquisitions totaled approximately $180B.  
 
Table 11 Background Data for Selected Pharmaceutical Firms 
 (Forbes.com) 
Acquirer Acquirer 
Size 
Acquired Acquired 
Size 
Merger Year 
(range) 
Acquisition 
Range 
 (in dollars) 
PharmaAlphaI Mid ApharmaI Small Before 2005 <$10B 
PharmaAlphaII Mid ApharmaII Small After 2005 
 
<$10B 
PharmaBeta Mid ApharmaIII Mid Before 2005 <$10B 
PharmaGamma Large ApharmaIV Large After 2005 >$10B 
PharmaDelta Mid ApharmaV Small After 2005 <$10B 
PharmaEpsilon Large APharmaVI Mid After 2005 <$10B 
PharmaZeta Large ApharmaVII Large Before 2005 >$10B 
PharmaETA Large ApharmaVIII Mid Before 2005 <$10B 
PharmaTheta Large ApharmaIX Large After 2005 >$10B 
PharmaIota Large ApharmaX Large After 2005 >$10B 
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Participants.  Judgmental sampling, a technique Bellenger et al. (1976) describes as the 
selection of participants according to the judgment of some person knowledgeable in the area 
being studied or is involved in the particular subject, was used to target recruitment for this 
research.  The participants for this study consisted of informants across both acquired and 
acquiring pharma firms who were employed at the firm during the merger, including pre- and 
post-merger activities.  Additionally, informants were portfolio decision-makers for R&D 
products.  A total of 13 informants from pharma firms in different geographical locations were 
selected for this study.    
 
Data Collection.  Three recruitment strategies were used for this study.  The first strategy 
entailed recruitment using the professional social media site known as LinkedIn.  The recruiter-
lite product through LinkedIn was used to send email invitations to 45 candidates who met the 
screening criteria for this study.  Of the 45 screened candidates, two informants were chosen. 
The second recruitment strategy involved solicitation through the researcher’s professional 
network.  The researcher sent the email invitation to former colleagues, co-workers, mentors, and 
professors.  This strategy yielded seven qualified informants.  The third recruitment strategy 
included snow-balling.  The initial contact was made with members of the researcher’s 
professional network, who then forwarded the email invitation to their respective networks.  
These prospects subsequently forwarded the email invitation to their respective networks.  This 
recruitment effort resulted in a total of four qualified informants.  
The email invitation used for this study is shown in Appendix E, Exhibit E3: Email 
Invitation.  This email included an invitation for pharma managers to participate in this study, 
and provided a short sentence about the research goal.   The subsequent paragraphs within the 
invitation described the interview process, informed consent and procedures for contacting the 
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researcher.  Interviews were scheduled at a time convenient to both the informant and 
researchers.  
Data was collected from all 13 informants using semi-structured and in-depth interviews.  
The interview protocol is outlined in Appendix B.  When possible, interviews were conducted 
face-to-face.  Due to constrained physical access to some informants, four of the interviews were 
face-to-face.  One interview was administered by SKYPE, and eight were conducted via phone. 
Interviews conducted face-to-face took place inside the informant’s office, or within a 
conference room located within the firm.  All interviews took place Monday through Friday 
between 9:00 a.m. and 7:00 p.m.  All Skype and telephone interviews took place in a private 
conference room at Georgia State University.  Conference room phones were utilized.  
Interviews ranged from 37 minutes to 1 hour 31 minutes.  Duration of all interviews totaled 9 
hours and 53 minutes. Follow-up phone calls or emails were sent to participants to clarify 
information captured during the interview. 
Firm data was collected from the FDA website. Firm financial data was also collected 
using financial websites such as Reuters.com and Yahoo Finance.  When available, portfolio 
matrices and decision-trees were reviewed.  Due to the sensitivity of the data collected, these 
artifacts were not allowed to be used as appendices in this study. As a result, the researcher took 
mental images of the data and noted the observations within the field notes. 
  
Interview Protocol.  Each informant was asked nine questions that contained a set of sub-
questions to allow for free, open-ended responses.  These questions were divided into three parts.  
Part I focused on the demographics of the informants, as well as an organizational aspect of PfM.  
Questions were asked regarding the merger impact on PfM, portfolio decision processes, and 
focus on goal from a firm and individual perspective.  The intent of this portion of the protocol 
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was to ascertain whether or not pharma decision processes, as described by informants, align 
with the literature. Further, we aimed to gain the perspective of informants as it relates to the 
firm’s portfolio condition, both past and future.  Part II focused on the portfolio methods adopted 
by the firm, how the firm and individual deal with risks.  The goal of this section was to 
determine if changes occurred within the methods across the different firms after the merger.  
Additionally, we aimed to determine if mergers influence informants’ decision making 
processes.   We also sought to assess the firm’s risk profile pre-and post-merger.  Another goal 
was to gain insight into how portfolio managers make difficult decisions during merger 
activities.  Finally, part III focused on how informants personally manage portfolios.  We asked 
questions that centered around individuals’ behaviors and attitudes during portfolio decision 
making. The interview protocol is displayed in Appendix B, Exhibit B-1. 
III.3 Data Analysis 
  
Each interview was analyzed by listening to recorded audio files that were filed and 
assigned informant number.  Field notes were tabulated and organized by informant to firm 
relationship to allow for content analysis.  The transcribed interviews for each informant were 
coded by the researcher and the researcher’s assistant to identify common themes within 
informants according to descriptive coding methods.  Coding was accomplished after a series of 
5 steps. 
First, the researcher leveraged insight from pharma industry experts for first cycle coding.   
Sub-categories were used for responses that answered multiple sub-questions.  Second, the 
researcher applied a content analysis technique and developed a set of word or phrase categories, 
based on each respondent’s responses.   Third, the researcher coded each response by the coding 
scheme.   Fourth, the research assistant generated patterns to use for the second coding cycle. All 
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three parts of the interview protocol were categorized, and themes were identified.   Lastly, the 
researchers collaborated on the determination of common themes until full agreement was 
reached.  
The researchers achieved inter-rater reliability by reaching 95 percent agreement after 
first cycle coding and 99 percent agreement after second cycle coding.   Cohen’s Kappa 
Coefficient was 0.75, which denotes adequate agreement (Randolph, 2008). 
Within-case analysis was used to identify how common narratives from different 
managers within pharma firms shape portfolio decisions during merger activities.  A cross-case 
analysis was conducted to identify differences in informants’ narratives from the acquiring 
versus the acquired pharma firms.  A chain of evidence was created to allow others to follow the 
derivation of any evidence from initial research questions to case study conclusions.   
Content analysis is defined by Berelson (as cited by Bellenger et al., 1976) as a technique 
for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communications.  This technique was utilized to glean important responses from the interviews 
(Bellenger et al., 1976).  The researchers followed the 7 steps for conducting content analysis, as 
suggested by Bellenger et al. (1976), which include: (1) specify needed data, (2) map out plans 
for tabulation, (3) lay out the skeleton of the outline, (4) fill in categories for each variable, (5) 
establish procedure for unitizing the material, (6) try out the analysis outline and unitizing 
procedure, and (7) use the analysis outline and interpret the results.  Microsoft EXCEL and QSR 
International Pty Ltd.’s NVIVO Version 10, 2012 for Windows was the tool used to facilitate 
content analysis for this study. 
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IV RESULTS 
 
In this study, all informants are represented as managers. Each manager and their respective 
firms have been given a pseudo name to maintain anonymity as requested by the informants. 
Managers are identified as “Informant,” followed by a numeral.  Acquiring firms will be identified 
as “Pharma,” followed by a Greek numeral.    Acquired firms will be identified as “APharma,” 
followed by a roman numeral.  Merger activities for this study include decisions made before, 
during and after M&A. 
IV.1 Demographics 
  
 Managers for this study are categorized into two groups.  Group one is composed of eight 
managers from acquiring firms.  Group two consists of five managers from acquired firms.   Other 
demographics include gender, race, education level, years with firm, and functional area of firm.  
Of the 13 managers, three are female and ten are male.  Concerning race, all managers are 
Caucasian, with the exception one African-American manager. All of the managers have college 
degrees.  Eight managers have doctoral degrees.  Three managers have master’s degrees, and two 
have bachelor’s degrees.  Four managers are or have been employed with the firm for greater than 
ten years.  The remaining nine managers are, or have been employed with the firm for less than 
ten years.   Eleven managers were employed at the executive-level.  One manager was employed 
at the middle-management level.  One manager was employed as a consultant.  
 During merger activities, managers worked within R&D across different functional areas.  
Two managers operated as c-suite executives. Seven managers worked directly within the PfM 
unit.  One manager worked within legal, one within strategy and one within operations.   Table 12 
provides a breakdown of the managers’ demographics grouped by the acquiring and acquired 
firms. 
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Table 12 Participant Demographics 
Managers - Acquiring Firms 
Identity Department Gender Firm Years 
with 
Firm 
Ethnicity Education 
Level 
Informant1 Legal Male PharmaAlphaI >10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant2 Portfolio 
Management 
Female PharmaAlphaII <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant3 R&D Female PharmaAlphaII <10 African- 
American 
Bachelors 
Informant4  Marketing Female PharmaAlphaII <10 Caucasian Masters 
Informant8 Portfolio 
Management 
Male PharmaDelta  <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant10 C-Suite Male PharmaZeta  <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant11 Strategy Male PharmaEta <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant13 Operations Male PharmaIota >10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Managers - Acquired Firms 
Informant5  C-Suite Male APharmaIII  <10 Caucasian Masters 
Informant6  Portfolio 
Management 
Male APharmaIV  >10 Caucasian Masters 
Informant7 
 
Portfolio 
Management 
Male APharmaIV  <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant9 
 
R&D Male APharmaVI  <10 Caucasian Doctorate 
Informant12 Portfolio 
Management 
Male APharmaIX >10 Caucasian Bachelors 
 
Tables 13 and 14 show the manager to firm relationships for this study.  Table 13 
represents managers from acquiring firms.  Table 14 represents managers from the acquired firm. 
There are a total of 10 different mergers that are represented in this study.  Two acquiring firms, 
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PharmaTheta and PharmaEpsilon, are represented in this study.  However, these two firms are 
not listed in Table 13 because there are no managers in this study from the acquiring firms.  
There are three managers who were employed by firms acquired by the same firm, which we 
refer to as PharmaGamma and PharmaTheta, which represents two separate mergers.  There was 
one manager employed by a firm acquired by PharmaEpsilon.  PharmaAlpha will be referred to 
as PharmaAlphaI and PharmaAlphaII, which represents one firm with to separate mergers.  
 
Table 13 Managers from Acquiring Firm 
Manager Acquiring Firm 
Informant1  PharmaAlphaI 
Informant2 PharmaAlphaII 
Informant3 PharmaAlphaII 
Informant4  PharmaAlphaII 
Informant8 PharmaDelta 
Informant10 PharmaZeta 
Informant11 PharmaEta 
Informant13 PharmaIota 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 Managers from Acquired Firm 
Manager Acquired Firm 
Informant5  APharmaIII 
Informant6  APharmaIV 
Informant7 APharmaIV 
Informant9 APharmaVI 
Informant12 APharmaIX 
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IV.2 Organizational Context and Processes 
  
Mergers are known to complicate PfM within any industry.  Within pharma, mergers 
happen almost yearly in effort to promote growth in one or many areas.  For this study, we asked 
managers: “What do you think led to the merger that has taken place within your firm?”  Figure 
6 displays the three categories that were derived from the analysis.  The three main merger goals 
as described by managers were to (a) gain a new footprint, (b) enter into a new therapeutic, and 
(c) strengthen the pipeline.   
 
Goal of Merger 
 
New Footprint.  One of the common goals of the merger was to obtain a new footprint.  
This goal was stated for five of the 10 firms.  These firms include: PharmaAlphaI, APharmaI, 
PharmaBeta, PharmaZeta, PharmaETA, and PharmaGamma.  For this study, a new footprint 
involved the acquisition of new divisions outside of the core competencies of the firm, such as 
consumers or medical devices.  The expansion of capabilities and opportunities to become the 
brand leader were also goals of the mergers.  
New Therapeutic Area.  Another goal was to obtain a new therapeutic area.  Two of the 
10 firms focused on this goal.  These firms include PharmaDelta and PharmaEpsilon.  In both 
cases, the firms sought entry into new markets outside of its existing capabilities.  The goal of 
both firms was to obtain a presence in these new areas to expand market share. 
Strengthen Pipeline.  Three of the 10 firms commissioned to strengthen its pipeline 
through acquisitions.  A strengthened pipeline indicates more viable and promising drugs will be 
launched.  These firms include PharmaGamma, PharmaAlpha, and PharmaIota.  These three 
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firms acquired competitors whose products were stronger and more robust.  In all three of these 
cases, the acquiring firms were experiencing a weakened pipeline before the mergers. 
Overall Goal of Merger.  All three of the above-mentioned goals seek so expand 
capabilities and grow pipelines. Figure 7 shows the three merger goals by firm.   Table 15 shows 
the categories and subcategories of the firms’ goals.  For each of the mergers, having the 
capacity to develop, launch and sell more products was a common goal.  There did not appear to 
be any differences in firm goals as it relates to firm size or acquisition amount. 
 
Figure 7 Goal of Merger – Firm Level 
 
• PharmaAlphaI
• PharmaBeta
• PharmaZeta
• PharmaETA
• PharmaTheta
New Footprint
• PharmaDelta
• PharmaEpsilon
New Therapeutic Area
•PharmaGamma 
•PharmaAlphaII
•PharmaIota
Strengthen Pipeline
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All of the managers had a clear understanding of their firms’ goals for the merger.  In each 
response, managers were able to communicate a clear strategy for the merger.  The goal to 
establish more products align with the findings from the literature that states growth expectations 
of pharma M&A. 
 
 
Table 15 Goal of Merger – Theme 
Merger Goal  Subcategory Theme 
 
 
 
New Footprint 
 
 
 
Expansion 
 
 
 
 
 
More Drugs 
 
New Therapeutic Area 
 
  
Strengthen Pipeline 
 
Pipeline Growth 
 
 
 Portfolio Condition.  After discovering the goal to launch more products, we sought to 
understand the condition of the firm’s portfolio through managers’ lenses.   Our first attempt to 
explore the narrative thought of managers was to inquire about their perspective of the firm’s 
portfolio condition before the merger.  We asked: “What do you think will happen to the portfolio 
in the future?”  Table 16 summarizes managers’ perspectives on the condition of their firm’s 
portfolio before the merger and their forecasts of the firm’s future portfolio. 
 Nine of 13 managers forecasted future growth for their firm’s portfolio.  Of the nine 
managers who forecasted future growth, five were from acquiring firms, and four were from 
acquired firms.   Two of 13 managers forecasted a decline in their firm’s portfolio.  Of the two 
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managers, one was from an acquiring firm and one was from an acquired firm.  One manager was 
uncertain about their acquired firm’s future portfolio condition.   
 
Table 16 Portfolio Condition of Firm 
Acquiring Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition 
 
Manager Firm Pre-Merger Future Forecast 
 
Informant1 PharmaAlphaI 
 
 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
Informant8 PharmaDelta 
 
Informant11 PharmaETA 
 
Informant10 PharmaZeta 
 
Informant3 PharmaAlpha 
 
Moderate 
 
Informant2 PharmaAlphaII Strong Decline 
 
Informant13 PharmaIota 
 
Strong  
Uncertainty 
 Informant4  PharmaAlphaII 
 
Weak 
Acquired Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition 
Informant5 
 
APharmaIII Weak Growth 
 
Informant6 APharmaIV 
 
 
 
Strong 
 
 
 
Growth 
 
Informant9 APharmaVI 
 
Informant12 APharmaIX 
 
    
Informant7 APharmaIV 
 
Moderate Decline 
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Nine of 13 managers viewed the pre-merger condition of their firm’s portfolio as strong.  
Of the nine managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio as strong before the merger, six were from 
acquiring firms, and three were from acquired firms.  Two of 13 managers viewed their firm’s pre-
merger portfolio condition as moderate.  Of the two managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio 
condition before the merger as moderate, one was from an acquired firm and one was from an 
acquiring firm.  Two of 13 managers viewed their firm’s pre-merger portfolio condition as weak.  
Of the two managers who viewed their firm’s portfolio condition before the merger as weak, one 
was from an acquired firm and one was from an acquiring firm.   
 Informant5 of APharmaIII was the only manager from an acquired firm who viewed the 
firm’s pre-merger portfolio condition as weak.  Informant5 explained: 
“We’re seeing the same thing we’ve seen in so many other areas in pharma kind 
of repeating today, Catrina. The pipeline yield went way down. After years of 
spending hundreds of hundreds of millions of dollars on R&D, only one product 
had come out.  For a number of years, nothing else came out.” 
 
Informant5 forecasted that the firm’s portfolio would grow post-merger. 
 Informant13 viewed his acquiring firm’s pre-merger condition as strong.  However, 
Informant13 was uncertain about the firm’s future growth.  Informant13 expressed concern for the 
possibility of drug terminations and divestments, as well as for the firm placing too much emphasis 
on blockbuster products.  Informant13’s comments suggest that the merger would result in fewer 
drugs based on his past experiences. When asked about the future condition of the portfolio, 
Informant13 stated: 
“I think it will be for sure some cuts specifically on the smaller projects which 
are not historically from PharmaIota, according to the past. There is a lot of 
stuff which have already proven or sold to someone else, but I think this kind of 
concentration on the big product will go on. They are reviewing the portfolio 
  
55 
carefully on regular basis so I think there would be further concentration on the 
big programs with smaller ones being sold.” 
 
Informant4 viewed her acquiring firm’s portfolio as weak pre-merger and also expressed 
uncertainty for the firm’s future portfolio.  Informant4’s uncertainty in the firm’s future portfolio 
stemmed from her past experiences with downsizing and a reduction in the sales force.  
Informant4 believed that the funding for future development could positively impact the future 
portfolio of a firm.  A new theme, “product promotion”, was identified while coding 
Informant4’s responses.  When a follow-up question was asked:   “Do you think the pipeline 
would sustain the firm’s future if funding is provided for future development?”  Informant4 
responded with:  
“I certainly hope so. I guess it depends on how successful we were in promoting 
them. That’s a deep question.” 
 
During the face-to-face interview, Informant4 paused for a great length of time before answering 
this question.   
Informant2 (of an acquiring firm) and Informant7 (of an acquired firm), were the only 
two managers who forecasted a decline in their firm’s future portfolio.   Informant7 provided the 
following explanation for his prediction: 
“Often it depends on what decisions they make. When they make those portfolio 
decisions when they merge, they don’t keep the pipeline of both companies. They 
whittle them down to a smaller number because it’s not just additive.” 
 
Informant7 emphasized the importance of decisions and its impact on the post-merger pipeline. 
Informant7 suggested that selecting the wrong products during merger activities could negatively 
impact a firm’s portfolio.  Informant2 forecasted a weakened pipeline due to the weaker pipeline 
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of the acquired firm.  Informant2’s forecast of a declining portfolio centers on her belief that 
R&D expenditures would decrease.  This is supported by Informant2’s response to her view of 
her firm’s future portfolio: 
“I’d like to think that PharmaAlphaII is going to continue to feel [therapeutic 
area] is an important place to be, and that there are not as many companies 
committed to [therapeutic area], so there’s opportunity there but it will take a 
lot of investment, and that’s the big question. I honestly don’t know if the 
company will invest beyond the areas they’re in right now.” 
 
Informant2 and Informant7 had differing perspectives as to why their firms would experience a 
decline in its future portfolio.  Their respective responses do not suggest that gender or level of 
education influenced the different perspectives. 
All three of the female managers at PharmaAlphaII had different views of their firm’s 
current and future portfolio condition.  Informant2, Informant3, and Informant4s’ views of the 
portfolio during the merger were strong, moderate and weak, respectively.  Informant2 
forecasted that the firm’s future portfolio would decline.   Informant3 forecasted that the firm’s 
future portfolio would grow.  Informant4 was uncertain about the firm’s future portfolio 
condition.  All 3 of the managers operated within different functional areas of the firm during 
merger activities.  Refer to Table 17 to view managers’ perspectives.  
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Table 17 Portfolio Condition Within Firm Analysis – PharmaAlphaII 
Acquiring Firm Managers’ Perspectives of Portfolio Condition  
Manager Firm During 
Merger 
Future Forecast 
(Post-merger) 
Informant2 PharmaAlphaII Strong Decline 
Informant3 PharmaAlphaII Moderate Growth 
Informant4  PharmaAlphaII Weak Uncertainty 
 
Two male managers from the PharmaGamma and ApharmaIV merger had differing views 
of the firm’s current and future portfolio condition.  Informant7 viewed the current condition of 
the firm’s portfolio as moderate.  Informant6 viewed the current condition of their firm’s portfolio 
as strong.  Informant7 forecasted a decline for the merged firm’s (PharmaGamma) future portfolio.  
Informant6 forecasted growth for the merged firm’s (PharmaGamma) future portfolio.  Both these 
managers operated within different functional areas for their respective firms during merger 
activities.  The responses from both managers do not suggest that education level influenced their 
perspectives. Table 18 displays the responses of these two managers. 
 
Table 18 Portfolio Condition Within Firm Analysis - PharmaGamma 
Acquired Firm Manager’s Perspectives of Portfolio Condition 
Manager Firm During 
Merger 
Merged Firm Future Forecast 
(Post-merger) 
Informant7 APharmaIV Moderate PharmaGamma Decline 
Informant6  APharmaIV Strong PharmaGamma Growth 
 
Overall, nine of the 13 managers forecasted future growth for their firm’s portfolio post-
merger.  A common theme among all nine managers is the belief that the firm would experience 
growth as a result of inheriting more drug products through M&A.   Informant3 attributed 
PharmaAlphaII’s post-merger growth forecast growth to a robust R&D pipeline. This is 
supported by her response: 
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“I think it will grow bigger.  They have a lot of great products in store that are 
yet to come, a lot of applications that are in R&D.” 
 
We asked Informant3 if she felt that the growth was a result of the merger, her response was: 
 
“I think so, yeah. I think it's a result of the mergers, a result of the change in 
leadership and the business model of the company. I think that has a lot to do 
with the direction that the company is going.” 
 
Informant3’s response suggests that she attributes her firm’s growth potential to new leadership 
and a new business model.  Informant11 attributed PharmaETA’s future growth to anticipated 
acquisitions.  He stated: 
“I think their portfolio is going to continue to be strong. They'll buy whatever 
they need to buy to continue that way.” 
 
Informant5 introduced the role of luck in future portfolio growth. He states: 
“I feel good about the portfolio; I feel very good about the level of science that's 
been advised.  The reality of it is in our space, we are all subjects to a bit of luck 
with the right science at the right time, with the right team doing the development 
work.”  
 
A common theme of the two managers who forecasted a decline in the firm’s portfolio is the 
belief that viable overlapping drugs would be eliminated as a result of M&A and R&D 
expenditures would decrease.  Figure 8 shows the common themes represented by all 13 
managers.  A common theme amongst growth forecasts includes (a) good leadership, (b) good 
(c) business model, (d) planned expansion, (e) good market differentiation, (f) and luck – the 
right science at the right time.   
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Figure 8 Common Themes Attributing to Future Portfolio Condition 
 
Archived data was obtained to measure managers’ forecasts against actual performance 
of the firm today.  Appendix F, Exhibit F-1 shows the firm’s revenue range pre- and post-
merger, and whether or not the firm experienced growth or decline after the merger.  Figure 9 
shows the firm performance after the merger.  Only half of the firms experienced post-merger 
growth. 
It is important to mention the context of the informants’ perspectives regarding the firm’s 
future portfolio condition.  Most managers forecasted portfolio growth as a result of having more 
drugs from the acquired and acquiring firms’ combined portfolios post-merger.  Portfolio growth 
in this context is the aggregate of the portfolios from Firm A (acquiring) and Firm B (acquired).  
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We do not believe informants considered the merged firm’s resultant portfolio condition when 
responding to this question.  The resultant portfolio consists of drugs selected after terminating 
or divesting drugs that overlap or do not align with the firm’s strategy.  The resultant portfolio is 
what gets R&D funding for further development and launch.  We did not capture informant 
perspectives on the resultant portfolio, but rather the condition of the future portfolio prior to 
actual performance.  This gap is worthy of further investigation in future research. 
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Figure 9 Post-Merger Performance 
 
 
Portfolio Processes 
 
Governance.  To explore how managers actually make decisions during a merger, we 
sought to gain insight into pre- and post-merger changes in the portfolio processes.  We asked 
managers: “How are portfolio decisions governed within your firm? How were these decisions 
governed before the merger?” All managers indicated that although they were responsible for 
making portfolio decisions, a governance board made the final decision.  The governance board 
activities were the same before the merger across all firms.   In addition to selecting and 
approving the final portfolio, managers reported that the governance board approves M&A 
transactions.  In this study, managers provided similar responses to the composition of the 
governance board.  Figure 10 shows the complexion of governance boards across all ten firms.  
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Similarly, these governance boards consisted of Investors (private or shareholders), 
Consultants, Medical Affairs, Board of Directors from the parent company, Executive 
Committee and Cross-Functional teams.  Cross-functional teams included common departments, 
such as Clinical, Finance, Safety, Human Resources, Legal, Marketing, Quality, Regulatory, 
R&D, Supply Chain, and Product Development.  In this study, senior managers or department 
heads from cross-functional teams served on the governance board.  Most of these senior 
managers resided at the firms’ headquarters.  
Informant5 noted that the governance board at PharmaBeta was composed of mostly 
men.  No other manager made this gender distinction for their respective firms.   
 
 
Figure 10 Governance Board Composition of Firms 
 
 
 
 
Cross-
Functional 
Teams
Clinical, Finance, Safety, 
Human Resources, Legal, 
Marketing, Quality, 
Regulatory, R&D, Supply 
Chain, Product 
Development
Medical
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Board of 
Directors Parent CompanyConsultants
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IV.3 Portfolio Valuation and Selection 
  
 Portfolio Decision-Making Process.  After understanding the composition of governance 
boards and how they operate within pharma firms, managers were asked: “Can you describe how 
portfolio decision-making processes within firm X work?”  We followed the question with: 
“How did the process work before the merger?”  It was discovered that decision-making 
processes at pharma firms occur iteratively throughout merger activities.  Also, these processes 
are not sequential.  For this reason, we have depicted these processes as events A through D that 
could occur at any interval during merger activities.  The top four commonly used processes 
were to (a) apply financial models, (b) conduct portfolio reviews, (c) assess market impact, and 
(d) prioritize the portfolio. 
 Six firms applied financial modeling during the decision-making process.  All firms that 
utilized this model did not change the process post-merger.  Figure 11 shows the categories and 
subcategories of the various financial methods used by these firms.  Firms looked at financial 
forecasts and development costs when making portfolio decisions. 
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Figure 11 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event A 
 
Five firms conducted portfolio reviews at varying intervals throughout the year.   During these 
reviews, managers presented their drug evaluations and recommendations to the governance 
board for final decision making.  Figure 12 shows firms that utilized some form portfolio review 
methods during portfolio decision making.  All firms that conducted portfolio reviews did not 
change this process post-merger.   
FirmSubcategoryCategory
Apply Financial
Models
Look at 
Forecasts
PharmaIota
Determine Cost
of Development
PharmaGamma
Attractiveness 
of Financials
PharmaETA
Forecast growth PharmaDelta
Look at 
financials
APharmaVI
APharmaVII
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Figure 12 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event B 
 
Two firms assessed market impacts while making portfolio decisions.  One of the firms, 
PharmaAlphaII, changed its post-merger decision-making process.   None of the informants from 
PharmaAlphaII identified market impact as a component to decision making, as they had pre-
merger.  Figure 13 shows the firms who assessed market impact while making portfolio 
decisions during merger activities. 
 
  
FirmSubcategoryCategory
Conduct 
Portfolio
Reviews
Review Portfolio
with Senior 
Management
PharmaDelta
Review Portfolio 
Weekly
PharmaIota
Conduct Periodic
Review
PharmaGamma
Conduct Stage-
Gates
APharmaVI
APharmaVII
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Figure 13 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event C 
 
Five firms prioritized its portfolio when making portfolio decisions.  All firms that ranked and 
prioritized its portfolio did not change the processes post-merger.  Figure 14 shows firms that 
prioritized the portfolio to select the most attractive drugs and introduce emerging drugs during 
merger activities. 
 
 
FirmSubcategoryCategory
Assess Market 
Impact
Decisions based 
upon market 
impact
PharmaAlphaII
Identify market 
impact
PharmaETA
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Figure 14 Pre- and Post-Merger Process Event D 
 
 
 
Changes in DM Processes.  The decision-making process did not change for seven of the 
firms after the merger.  Of the seven firms with no change in the decision-making process, five 
were acquiring and two were acquired firms.   The decision-making process did change after the 
merger for three firms.  Of the three firms, one was an acquirer and the other was acquired. Table 
19 shows a break-down of the firms that showed changes, as well as no changes in the decision-
making process during merger activities. 
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Prioritize 
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PharmaGamma
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PharmaDelta
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PharmaETA
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Table 19 Change in Decision-Making Process by Firm 
Firm 
                    
No Change in Process  Change in Process 
   
Acquiring Firms PharmaAlphaI 
PharmaDelta 
PharmaETA 
PharmaIota 
PharmaGamma 
 PharmaAlphaII 
 
Acquired Firms APharmaVI 
APharmaVII 
 APharmaIII 
APharmaIX 
 
 
 Pre-Merger Process Changes.  Two of the three firms’ processes that changed post-
merger had pre-merger processes that were unstructured and carried out in silos. These two firms 
were PharmaAlphaII and APharmaIII.  PharmaAlphaII and ApharmaIII’s pre-merger decision-
making process involved ad-hoc decision making with no buy-in from other teams.  
PharmaAlphaII’s decision making before the merger was investor driven with no clearly defined 
decision-making processes.  Informant3’s perspective of PharmaAlphaII’s pre-merger decision-
making process as follows: 
“To be honest with you, there wasn't really a clear cut process for the steps to 
go through, like first you contact this person then that person. I think over time 
based on trial and error and doing some of these we've formulated a process.”  
 
APharmaIII’s pre-merger decision-making process was also informal.  Further, its pre-merger 
processes were political and inward looking.  Informant5 described APharmaIII’s pre-merger 
decision-making process as: 
“It was a group of guys who got together and would come in and say yeah we 
like this program, no we don't really like this one.  It was ad-hoc and informal.  
It didn't have input from stakeholders throughout the organization. I'm sure 
there was more data that flowed into it than we saw. I wasn't on that executive 
team of [small number]. I was that very next level in the organization reporting 
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to that group.  For a number of years until the leadership really settled back out 
at APharmaIII, it was an effort to use the data, but often seemed in support a 
pre-existing preference for the child of the clinical development programs or 
R&D programs from the company that you originated. That portfolio process 
became highly politicized of people from legacy PharmaBeta wanting to keep 
the PharmaBeta programs alive. Either because they believed in them or 
because they knew them.   As I mentioned they're kind of their children or 
because they want to make sure that [site] stayed open.” 
 
Pre-merger processes appeared to consist of smaller teams of executives and investors who made 
critical decisions with little to no buy-in from managers who have the most knowledge about the 
drug and its growth potential. 
 
 Post-Merger Process Changes.  PharmaAlphaII and PharmaBeta showed significant 
changes in the decision-making process post-merger.  PharmaAlphaII underwent a process 
improvement initiative post-merger that aligned with more common decision-making processes 
described by the other firms.  PharmaAlphaII and PharmaBeta applied financial models and 
conducted portfolio reviews as a result of the merger.   
 Informant5 elaborated on why decision-making processes improved significantly at 
APharmaIII.  Informant5 stated: 
“I really think the recent progress and the recent refocusing that we've seen in 
the last [X] years has truly built shareholder value at APharmaIII. That didn't 
come about until the last exit of the old people. They kind of moved out, and all 
of the politics and personal ownership was put to bed. True professional 
[industry] leadership has a real strong history of the ability to assess programs. 
The lifeblood of all these companies, the future value of all these companies is 
really all about the decisions that are made during the portfolio management 
process. To do it in any way that allows those distractions- We're all human and 
we all bring that.   You have to recognize that. To not make the effort to 
professionalize and really work through what assets the company has and the 
value of each of them, lines up against the skills sets of the organization and 
make those hard choices on where you’re going to focus and invest hours.” 
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Post-merger processes seemed to work best when the leadership changed and politics were 
lessened.  All of the managers emphasized the value of making good decisions for the portfolio 
so that long-term growth can be realized. 
Emerging Theme.  A theme emerged as managers described pre- and post-merger 
decision-making processes within their respective firms.  Informant5 introduced the role of 
culture and its impact on his firm’s pre-merger decision-making process: 
“APharmaIII pre-merger, when I sort of realized the company grew out of a 
single drug that was unexpectedly successful in the treatment of [disease]. 
Really only looked there because of the vision of one physician. Didn't really 
work for the company, one external [doctor] who basically strong-armed the 
company into doing work. The first and only product the company launched was 
wildly successful.  You had an organization where people had grown up and 
thought that was normal and didn't understand that most companies fail a lot 
more before they have that big hit, and have a lot of small hits before they have 
that big hit and have that balanced view. APharmaIII was a very inward- looking 
culture.” 
Culture appeared to have an impact on how managers make portfolio decisions.  Many firms 
don’t seek out long-term R&D developments and the profits from short-term wins fall short of 
sustaining long-term growth. 
 
Decision-Making Methods.  Governance, decision-making processes, and methods are 
all included within the PfM process. We asked managers: “What kinds of methods are being 
used within firm X for making portfolio decisions?” We followed the question with: “Were these 
methods used before the merger?”  Table 20 shows the firm whose methods changed or did not 
change during merger activities. Table 21 displays the different methods used across firm during 
decision-making processes. 
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Table 20 Change in Decision-Making Methods by Firm 
Firm 
                    
No Change Change 
Acquiring Firms PharmaAlphaI 
PharmaDelta 
PharmaZeta 
PharmaETA 
PharmaIota 
 
PharmaAlphaII 
Acquired Firms APharmaIV 
APharmaVI 
 
APharmaIX 
APharmaIII 
 
 
 
The majority of firms (seven) showed no change in methods during merger activities. Three 
firms showed changes in methods post-merger. 
 
 Common Methods.  Six firms used financial methods, such as ROI, NPV, and payback 
period when making portfolio decisions during merger activities.   Managers across four firms 
relied on intuition as a method to aid them in decision making.  Qualitative assessments were 
used by managers from three firms.  Evidence-based decision making methods were used by 
managers from two firms.   
  
 Pre- and Post-Merger Methods.  One or more of the common methods mentioned in the 
above section was used during merger activities across all firms.  Most of the methods were used 
in both pre- and post-merger settings.  Other methods presented within the literature were also 
used independently across firms.  These methods included expert analysis and weighted scoring. 
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Table 21 Methods Used Across Firms 
Category  Subcategory  Firm 
 
Financial Models 
 NPV 
ROI 
NPV 
Sales Forecasts 
Payback Period 
Forecasts 
 PharmaAlphaI 
PharmaAlphaII 
PharmaGamma 
PharmaDelta 
APharmaIX 
PharmaIota 
Intuition  Internal Thought of 
Leaders 
 
 PharmaDelta 
PharmaEpsilon 
PharmaZeta 
PharmaETA 
 
Qualitative 
Assessments 
 Due Diligence 
Case-by-Case Analysis 
Evaluation Models 
Decision-tree 
 
 PharmaAlphaII  
PharmaDelta 
PharmaETA 
Evidence-Based  Market Data 
Clinical Trial Data 
Historical Data 
 
 PharmaAlphaII 
PharmaETA 
 
  
Effectiveness of Methods.  After we confirmed that methods mentioned in the literature 
are being used by managers in this study, we asked managers: “Do you feel these methods are 
effective?”  Table 22 show the responses from managers across various firms.  Nine of the 13 
managers stated that their firms’ methods were effective.  Three managers form acquiring and 
acquired firms felt their firms’ methods were ineffective.  One manager stated that their firm’s 
methods are sometimes effective.   
Managers who reported method effectiveness shared three common themes: use of (a) 
evidence-based methodology, (b) transparency, and (c) cross-functional buy-in.  Managers who 
reported ineffectiveness shared one common theme:  Failure to effectively integrate.  Lack of 
transparency and not obtaining buy-in were other reasons for method ineffectiveness.  Other 
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reasons provided by managers to explain method ineffectiveness were ineffective decision 
making, troubled pipeline, and merger complexity.  
  
 Ineffective Methods.  Informant5 provided an explanation for the ineffectiveness of 
methods at his firm. He stated: 
“It was just two vastly very different cultures. The attempt to juggle them without 
forcing the organization to become a single combined entity led to an extended 
period of failure to integrate. This led to, in my view, an extended failure to make 
tough decisions rapidly because you had to play the political game of is this 
decision a detriment of one of the two sides.  How can I recruit enough strength 
from this other side in order to prevail? That affected even the portfolio 
management processes because you had so much personal ownership of the 
programs, that you were trying to prioritize in the portfolio.” 
 
The failure to integrate was the primary cause of ineffective methods within firms. 
 
  
 Overall Changes.  Our findings show that most of the methods and processes did not 
change post-merger, but half of the firms in the study experienced a decline in financial 
performance post-merger.  Since most processes and methods remained the same post-merger, 
they must have been applied in a more rigorous manner.  We posit that the merged firm’s 
leadership (CEO, Governance Board) focused more on late-stage development, and terminated 
early stage developments that could have potentially resulted in long-term growth.   
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Table 22 Decision-Making Method Effectiveness 
Acquiring Firms 
 
Firm Manager Reason Effectiveness 
PharmaAlphaI Informant1 Uniform procedure 
Effective communication 
Early Buy-in  
Effective 
PharmaAlphaII  Informant2 Disciplined 
Non-biased 
Effective 
PharmaAlphaII Informant3 Buy-in 
Collaboration 
Evidence-based 
Effective 
PharmaAlphaII Informant4 - Effective 
PharmaDelta Informant8 Transparency 
Accurate Forecasts 
Honesty 
Cross-functional buy-in 
Intuition 
Effective 
PharmaZeta Informant10 Ineffective merger strategy 
Ineffective decision making 
Ineffective 
PharmaETA Informant11 Use of metrics Effective 
PharmaIota Informant 13 Diversified decision making Effective 
Acquired Firms 
 
APharmaIII Informant5 Lack of transparency 
Failure to integrate 
No buy-in 
Merger complexity 
Ineffective 
APharmaIV Informant8 Evidence-based  
validation post-decision  
Effective  
APharmaIV Informant7 Troubled pipeline Ineffective 
APharmaVI Informant9 Risk-based decision making Sometimes 
ApharmaIX Informant12 Thoroughness Effective 
 
 
 Firm Goals.  After gaining insight into firms’ processes and methods, we delve into the 
goals of the firm.  Managers were asked: “Have the goals of the firm changed since the merger?” 
If so, how?  All of the managers stated that goals of their respective firms changed after the merger 
(refer to Table 23).  All managers from the firms provided various reasons for the change in goals.  
PharmaIota and PharmaAlpha goals became more patient focused.  PharmaGamma, 
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PharmaEpsilon, PharmaEta, and PharmaDelta focused on expansion.  PharmaBeta became more 
R&D driven.  PharmaZeta changed its strategy. 
 
Table 23 Change in Firm Goals 
Firm Did firm’s goal 
change after the 
merger? 
PharmaAlphaI Yes 
PharmaAlphaII Yes 
PharmaDelta Yes 
PharmaZeta Yes 
PharmaETA Yes 
PharmaIota Yes 
APharmaIII Yes 
APharmaIV Yes 
APharamIX Yes 
APharmaVI Yes 
 
 We gained further insight into firms’ goals by asking managers: “Are the firm’s goal long 
or short-term focused?  We followed with: “Has this focus changed since the merger?” We then 
asked managers: “Do you feel your firm’s goals are attainable?” Table 24 shows the varied 
responses across all firms. 
 PharmaTheta was the only firm to change its focus (after its merger with APharmaIX).  Its 
focus changed from long- to short-term.  Informant12 elaborated that APharmaIX’s pre-merger 
short-term focus was due to the year-over-year sales goals.  ApharmaIX was long-term focused 
  
76 
post-merger because they had a new strategic vision.  The focus of all of the other firms did not 
change after the merger.   
 
 Pre-Merger Goal Focus and Attainment.  Eight managers viewed their firm’s focus as 
long-term, with a heavy emphasis on R&D.  Informant8’s response aligned with all of the eight 
managers’ perspectives supporting long-term focus: 
“I think it's a near term which is squarely focused on getting this product 
approved. I think, yeah, going back to my earlier point, we still have very much 
of a long term play because this is one milestone.   Potential approval is one 
milestone, but we're still very much focused on building and driving R&D 
internally. That requires much more longer-term thinking and planning this is a 
shorter-term focus. I think in that respect, our goals have always remained, and 
still remain more long term in terms of developing longer-term consistent value 
to our shareholders.” 
 
 Four managers viewed their firm’s focus as short-term.  One manager viewed their firm as both 
long and short-term focused.   
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Table 24 Firm Focus Pre- and Post-Merger 
Managers’ Perspectives - Acquiring Firms 
Informant Firm Pre-Merger 
Focus 
Post-Merger 
Focus 
Attainable 
Goals? 
Informant1 PharmaAlphaI  
 
Long 
 
 
 
 
 
No Change 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
Informant3 PharmaAlphaII 
Informant8 PharmaDelta 
Informant11 PharmaETA 
Informant13 PharmaIota 
Informant2 PharmaAlpha2 
 
 
 
Short 
 
 
Uncertain 
 Informant10 PharmaZeta 
Informant4  PharmaAlpha2 Yes 
Managers’ Perspectives - Acquired Firms 
 
Informant5   APharmaII Long  
 
Same 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
Informant6  APharmaIV Both 
Informant7 APharmaIV Short 
Informant9 APharmaVI Long Same Uncertain 
Informant12 APharmaIX Long Short No 
 
Informant6 explained why APharmaIV’s focus was both long and short-term focused: 
“I would say 60:40, 60 being short term. When I say short-term, like two years 
to three years. Long term is like is three and above.  It would be more executing 
smaller tactical projects to gain momentum, increasing net sales and increasing 
distribution as certain short-term goals. In addition, any quick wins in terms of 
reducing overhead, reducing destruction of products, managing cost, would 
have been more of those efficiency type projects were the short term. The same 
type of projects was long term as well. Sometimes a new product with new 
technology or new products that had to be reached in a brand new country would 
take long time. Just two new products and efficiency projects were implemented, 
but the time or duration to implement those in certain markets or certain type of 
products took longer time, so it became long term objectives.” 
 
 Nine of the managers felt their firms’ goals were attainable.  Three managers expressed 
uncertainty regarding goal attainment.  The common theme amongst these three managers was a 
lack of R&D/innovation.  Only one manager felt their firm’s goals were unattainable due to the 
unrealistic component of the goal.  Informant12 simply stated: 
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“I feel like they are way too far out of reach.  They're incredibly optimistic, and 
it just isn't realistic at all that we can achieve those financial goals.”  
 
We’ve learned that merged firms had a different goal structure post-merger.  The new 
goals focused more on ROI.  When a firm is more focused on financial goals, R&D expenditures 
get cut as a cost-saving measure.  We posit that the lack of R&D funding contributes to post-
merger portfolio shrinkage.  
Firms’ Risk Profiles.  Firms have a propensity for dealing with risks differently.   A firm 
is considered to be risk averse if it seeks to reduce uncertainty when faced with it.  We asked 
managers: “Is your firm more risk averse post-merger as it was pre-merger?”  Table 25 shows a 
summary of manager responses and their respective firm’s risk profile. 
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Table 25 Risk Profile Post-Merger 
Acquiring Firms 
 
Firm Summary of Managers’ Perspectives Risk Averse 
PharmaAlphaI 
 
The Board of Directors and Investors are far more risk 
averse.   
 
 
 
 
 
More  
 
PharmaIota Doing more risk management since the merger. Risk 
management is now applied to every brand. 
 
PharmaAlphaII More risk conscious. Firm looks for mitigation strategies. 
 
PharmaDelta Merger made firm think very carefully about portfolio 
decision making.  Changed risk taking approach after the 
merger. 
 
PharmaZeta In general, as firms become larger, they become more and 
more risk-averse. 
 
PharmaAlphaII Taking more risks and changed how they look at R&D. 
 
 
 
Less  
 
PharmaAlphaII The pharma division was growing but there wasn’t a lot of 
activity there in terms of dynamic growth through 
acquisition. Firm rapidly acquired two more firms. 
 
PharmaETA - No Change 
Acquired Firms 
 
APharamaIII Firm wanted to win and wanted to take more risks but was 
afraid of failure. Firm was forced to take more clinical and 
regulatory risks. 
 
Less  
APharmaIX The firm bases a lot of the decisions on numbers and 
valuations but it also doesn't allow any mistakes. Firm 
isn’t very supportive of risks.  
 
 
 
More  
 
 
APharmaIV - 
APharmaIV -  
No Change 
 
APharmaVI Small acquisition. Merger didn't make a difference. 
  
 Ten of the 13 managers stated that their firm’s risk tolerance changed after the merger.  
Seven managers indicated their firm was more risk averse after the merger.  Three managers 
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reported that their firm was less risk averse post-merger.  Three managers said their firms did not 
change its risk profile after the merger. 
 Firms that became more risk averse post-merger engaged in more risk management 
activities, especially within R&D.  Managers of firms that became less risk averse post-merger 
all stated that their firms were willing to take more risks in exchange for growth opportunities.   
 There were no differences in risk aversion between acquired and acquiring firms.  There 
were differences in the responses within the same firms.  One of the three PharmaAlphaII 
managers viewed their firm as more risk averse post-merger, as opposed to the other two 
managers who felt their firm was less risk averse.  The two managers with the same risk aversion 
perspective provided different justifications for their perspectives.  Likewise, the two managers 
from the PharmaGamma/APharmaIV merger had varying perspectives of their firm’s risk 
aversion.  One manager felt the firm was more risk averse, while the other felt there was no 
change in the way it faced risks post-merger.  The majority of managers, who were from either 
the acquired or acquiring firms that were large, stated that the firm had become more risk averse 
post-merger. 
 If firms become more risk averse post-merger, they are less likely to take risks on R&D 
drugs that may need further development or enhancement.  We suggest that as pipelines are 
assessed with more rigor to rule out risky drugs, the portfolio shrinks and firms launch less drugs 
over a long period of time.  This is another plausible explanation as to why portfolios shrink 
post-merger. 
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IV.4 Individual Behaviors 
  
After gaining insight into managers’ perspectives of the firms’ goals, processes, and 
methods, we asked managers three questions relating to their individual behavior during merger 
activities within their respective firms.   
Personal Goals.  Theory of Narrative Thought states that values help form the narrative 
thought of individuals, which then influences their decision making.  One of three questions we 
asked managers is: “Have your personal goals changed since the firm has merged?”  Figure 15 
displays the common themes of the managers’ personal goals after the merger. 
 Seven managers indicated that a change in personal goals had occurred after the merger.  
Six managers said their goals had changed.  All of the managers aligned their personal goals with 
that of the firms’.  The subcategories generated during coding include: (a) gain more experience, 
(b) knowledge expansion, (c) enhance skillset and (d) job stability.  Overall, most of the managers 
saw the merger as an opportunity to gain more experience to secure their careers.  
Career Growth and Enhanced Skillet.  Informant2 leveraged the merger by gaining 
experience for her next career.  Informant2 shared how she plans her personal goal during merger 
activities: 
“As you appreciate, it would be much of what happens in one’s career 
sometimes driven by events you can't control as you say by a company getting 
bought or positioned being eliminated. I'm always of the mindset that I need to 
be my own advocate for where I might go next or what opportunity or risk I want 
to take. I look at that and see, can I put these pieces together and then, will that 
get me to where I think I want to go? It's funny you asked because I have been 
thinking a lot about, "Well, what will my next job be and what did that look like 
and what are pieces that I'm interested in?" I've been thinking a lot about where 
my current kind of interest is and even though I don't have a lot of formal 
experience there, I'm very interested in [industry], so I've been spending a lot of 
time with [department] colleagues at PharmaAlphaII just trying to learn and get 
involved to where I can.” 
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Figure 15 Managers’ Personal Goals 
Informant 3’s personal goal strategy was similar to Informant2’s: 
“I think now that they have so many different avenues you can go down, and 
PharmaAlphaII offers so much training, there's a lot of things you can get 
involved in. When I started, I was just working with the established brands and 
products, as well as, like I mentioned the pipeline products. Now that I've been 
involved with that one [product], there's a [branch of medicine] side of it, and 
so now my focus has shifted to the [branch of medicine] side of it, so I'm kind of 
passionate about that. I really didn't know a whole lot about [branch of 
medicine], so now my goal is to learn more about that [branch of medicine] 
population, and [disease] and determine how I can add value to that.” 
Informant12 shared the same personal goals as Informant3 and Informant2: 
“It's going to force me to be a lot more patient. I'm not going to be able to 
achieve the things that I want to do in the time frame I need to, because they're 
just much more deliberate about how your career is going to move and how fast 
and in which directions. You have to just plan things out on a longer timeline to 
where you want to be versus at PharmaTheta, I think you could have done in a 
much, much shorter timeline.” 
 
Job Stability and Knowledge Expansion.  Informant4 aimed to increase her knowledge 
after the merger: 
“It makes it more interesting; growing, doing things that are more impactful for 
the organization, have a deeper understanding of what's going on in the 
industry.” 
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Personal Stake in Decision Outcome.  We asked managers: “What’s personally at stake 
when making portfolio decisions?”  Consistent with the change in personal goals as a result of 
the merger, managers considered their reputation when making decisions.  Table 26 shows the 
managers’ narratives and categories of what’s personally at stake for them when making 
portfolio decisions. 
 
Table 26 Personal Stake in Decision 
Number of 
Informants 
Subcategory of Narratives Category 
5 Good representation of client, reputation, more respect, 
integrity, good relationship with marketing, esteem 
Reputation 
7 Good guidance, good decisions realized, desire to make 
great contributions, avoid failures, concerned about 
losing, to know that I've done a good job, sense of 
building company and patient therapies, achievement, 
positive outcome, just want to succeed 
Success 
3 
 
Bonus, income Reward 
3 Gaining more knowledge and experience, better career 
exposure, job security 
Career 
Growth 
 
Five managers felt their reputation was at stake while making portfolio decisions.  These 
managers looked forward to the esteem of their leaders and colleagues as a result of a good 
decision.    It was also important for the majority of managers (seven) to make a worthy 
contribution to the firm through their decision making.  Managers sought to provide proper 
guidance to aid in final decision making that results in a viable portfolio.  Most of these 
managers want to succeed in making the right decisions for the firm.  Few managers (three) felt 
their income bonuses were at stake when making decisions. 
 When making portfolio decisions, two managers spoke strongly about their concern for 
human resources.  Informant5 passionately expressed his personal stake in potential resource 
loss: 
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“There's nothing worse than having to let people go because the company bet 
on the wrong horse or the company made a bad decision.  There's an awful lot 
more at stake than personal income. I'll survive, I'll go get another job. That's 
not an issue, in your term it hurts, but it's more really how it affects the company, 
especially small companies. They take a long time to recover from a major 
mistake or a major bad decision. That's the one thing. We're really here to build 
the company, to build the careers of the people who are committed to working 
alongside us as we build these places. To me that's an awful lot more painful to 
see that one got away than to see your bonus cut by 20%. Yeah, it's nice to get 
an extra 20% on your bonus, but it's a whole lot better to go out and hire 40 new 
people who might have been working at the coal industry.” 
 
Likewise, Informant6 emphasized the importance of people in his decision making: 
“I typically don't look at my personal part of it. I look at it from more of an 
outcome-based decision maker. If my decision is going to help the outcome I will 
do it and also very strong in terms of emotional intelligence, look at any impact 
on people. Those are the two that I would look at. Am I going to achieve the 
objective or the outcome? In the process, what I'm I going to actually lose, if 
any? Especially when it comes to people, I want to make sure that achieving the 
outcome cannot be by killing like 500 people in between. You got to make sure 
that you balance that in terms of what hardship my decision would bring to 
people and what is the positive outcome that would actually let.”  
 
It was interesting to discover that managers don’t only think of themselves when making 
decisions.  They consider the livelihood of those around them as well.  This discovery suggests 
that managers may make decisions in favor of people rather than of the firm. 
  
Rewards & Recognition.  After learning that reputation, success, reward and career 
growth are personally at stake when making decisions, we asked managers: “Are you rewarded 
for the decisions you make?”  All managers are rewarded for decisions made, with the exception 
of Informant2 and Informant12.   Figure 16 shows the four common rewards granted to 
respective managers.  One of the two managers who were not rewarded indicated that there was 
no mechanism in place to measure success after the merger. 
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Most managers encountered tangible and intangible rewards as a result of making good 
decisions.  Tangible rewards came in the form of financial incentives, such as bonuses and profit 
sharing programs.  Intangible rewards included gaining the trust of governance boards that 
resulted in opportunities to learn cross-functionally and take on more decision-making 
responsibilities.  Earning the trust of managers’ respective leadership teams and being regarded 
in high esteem were other rewards.   Interestingly, few managers stated that they were not 
penalized for bad decisions or outcomes.  Rather, they were told to do better and try harder next 
time.  It is also worth mentioning that only one manager viewed early stage success of the firm’s 
portfolio as a reward. 
 
Figure 16 Managers’ Rewards 
 
Individual Decision Making.  The next question directly addresses our research question: 
How do managers make portfolio decisions during a merger?  We asked managers: “Can you 
describe a recent portfolio decision?”  We followed the question with: “Did the merger 
influence this decision?”  We captured each manager’s approach to decision making and 
provided a general description of the decision scenario.  Figure 17 displays managers’ 
approaches. 
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The decision outcome presented by managers involved one of the following categories: 
(a) product licensing, (b) abbreviated new drug administration, (c) portfolio alignment, (d) 
portfolio strategy, and (e) new market entry.  All managers felt their decisions were influenced 
by the merger, with the exception of Informant3 and Informant13.  Across all firms, the 
governance board influenced managers’ decisions.   
 
  
Figure 17 Managers’ Approaches to Decision Making 
*Decision making was not influenced by merger 
 Managers had four common approaches to decision making.  Some managers adopted a 
combination of these approaches.  One approach taken by four managers was to consider lessons 
learned from their decisions made during former mergers.  Managers recalled how past mergers 
were approached and mimicked its success, as well as avoided its failures.   These managers 
mentioned being more disciplined in their decision making.  Prior to their merger experience, 
they reported ignoring warning signs of drugs that seemed promising.    
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A second approach was to identify risks.  Four managers adopted this approach and 
generated risk responses for portfolio risks.  Managers taking this approach mentioned fear of 
losing market share for making wrong decisions.   
A third approach was to align the decisions with the firms’ goals.  The four managers 
utilizing this approach indicated that their decision making was heavily influenced by the 
acquiring firm’s governance board.  Further, decisions had to be tailored to meet the needs of the 
new leadership of the merged entity.  Informant2 described how the merger influenced one of her 
recent decisions: 
“The key reasons why senior management didn't support it really were 
multifold. One happened to be that the time at which this opportunity went in 
front of the executive committee and essentially the CEO and [his/her] senior 
team, the company was going through a global reorganization. Unfortunately, 
the individuals who were in part of the dialog and who have been involved or 
updated on the deal for the prior six months completely changed. You had a 
whole new group of decision-makers, stakeholders so I think that was a 
challenge. Then also, there were just very different priorities amongst that new 
group in terms of where they wanted to focus their respective resources.”  
 
In many cases, the new leadership team and the change in firm goals changed how managers 
approached decision making after the merger.  Informant6 indicated that a portfolio decision was 
made before the merger, but changed when the merger was announced.  He stated: 
“The new leader had a new plan for the organization which we all aligned on, 
which means we need to make these changes to make sure that we get behind 
it.” 
 
The fourth approach was the reliance on financial models.  Managers who adopted this 
approach practiced evidence-based decision making.  These managers built financial models and 
assessed them against pre- and post-merger portfolios.  Informant1 focused on being objective in 
his decision making and not allowing political influence to drive his decisions.  He stated: 
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“We tried to be as objective as possible and just based it on the data, as opposed 
to being influenced by the politics.” 
 
Managers sought out ways to apply evidence-based approaches to decision making. 
 
Difficult Decision Making.  The complexities of mergers can create an environment of 
uncertainty and complexity where managers can be faced with difficult decision making.  For 
this reason, we aimed to determine how managers make decisions when faced with uncertainty.   
The previous responses provided insight into the general decision-making approaches taken by 
managers.  To gauge managers’ decision-making approaches when faced with uncertainty, we 
asked managers: “Can you describe a situation in which you were confronted with a difficult 
portfolio decision during a merger?”  We then asked managers: “Were you satisfied with the 
decision?”  We captured the manager’s decision scenario and elements that made the decision 
difficult.  We then classified their risk responses into two main categories: (a) avoid and (b) 
accept.  
For this study, we define risk avoidance as making a change to the portfolio decision. 
Risk acceptance is proceeding with the decision as planned and having a response plan in place 
in the event the risk occurs.  Table 27 shows the managers’ risk responses when making difficult 
decisions during a merger. 
Lack of agreement between decision-makers was key to making managers’ decisions 
difficult.  When describing the complexity of a decision, Informant8 concluded with the 
following statement: 
“I'd say the dichotomy in beliefs within the team made it a very challenging 
situation and decision.” 
 
  
89 
The level of risk associated with the decision also complicated managerial decision making. 
Managers who were faced with risky decisions avoided the risks.  Other complexities included 
fear of making wrong decisions, lack of experience and complexity of matrix organization. 
Decisions that involved drugs in phase I (early stage) under constrained R&D budgets also 
complicated managerial decision making. 
One manager noted their intuition went against the evidence presented, hence making the 
decision extremely difficult. This manager accepted the risk and carried out the decision.  
All managers were satisfied with the decision they’d made when faced with uncertainty.  
Six managers accepted risks and carried out their decisions.  Four managers avoided risks and 
made new decisions.   
Although most managers’ firms were more risk averse post-merger, the majority of 
managers took more risks when making complex decisions during merger activities.  This 
finding contradicts literature that reveals managers adopt a firm’s risk aversion during decision 
making.  Although we’ve found that managers align their goals with that of the firms’ while 
making decisions, they tend to abandon their firm alignment when faced with uncertainty. We 
elaborate further on this finding in a later chapter. 
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Table 27 Managers’ Risk Approaches to Difficult Decision 
Informant Decision Reason for Difficulty 
 
Risk 
Response 
Informant2 Partnership Risky negotiation  
 
 
 
 
Avoid 
 
Informant3 Terminate Drug Lack of agreement between decision-
makers 
 
Informant13 R&D Site Closure Complexity of Decision 
Approval process 
Informant1 Divest generic drug Risky investment 
Informant8 Delay Launch Lack of agreement between decision-
makers 
 
Intuition conflicted with evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Accept 
 
Informant6  Global Expansion  Lack of experience  
 
Informant7 Product Development Constrained R&D budget 
 
Informant11 Drug Selection Phase I Development 
 
Informant12 Manufacturing Site 
Closure 
Fear of making wrong decision 
Informant4  Terminate promotion of 
drug 
Complexity of matrix organization 
 
 
  
 Managers’ Past Experiences.  To further explore TNT, we asked managers: “Do you 
think your past experiences influences your portfolio decisions now?”  We captured narratives 
from 10 managers and displayed them in Table 28.   
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Table 28 Managers’ Narratives -  Influence of Past Experiences 
Informant Quotes 
Informant1 “Yes, past experiences inform portfolio decisions. Lessons learned from 
previous deals make me look at deals differently today.” 
 
Informant2 “Yes, in terms of experience. Have objectivity but experience has impact on 
how to position the opportunity or head off challenges. Think about how 
things could potentially occur just based on experiences I’ve had.” 
 
Informant3 “Yes, previously did what you were told to do. Once importance is 
understood, can make better decision making.  You look at things from a 
different aspect when you're a little bit more seasoned than when you start 
off.” 
 
Informant4  “Yes, can provide insight now.   I have more knowledge. I am able to pinpoint 
“go”/”no go” decisions.” 
 
Informant5  “Yes, absolutely.  Once burned, twice shy.  I view the future through prism of 
the past. The lessons you've learned, good or bad, influence every decision we 
all make.”   
 
Informant6  “Yes, knowledge from years at previous pharma firms.  Also experiences 
from training classes.” 
 
Informant7 “Yes, past experiences about culture of R&D.  I make recommendations 
based on experience. I’ve learned from 6 previous M&A.”  
 
Informant8 “Yes, past experience in different therapeutic areas are good. Important to 
consider other viewpoints. Allow you to play out scenarios. Leveraging past 
experiences is important.” 
 
Informant11 “Yes, ability to be objective and neutral.” 
 
Informant12 “Yes, I’ve learned throughout my career. Each time a product is evaluated I 
learn. You're learning from your past experiences and picking up on things 
that maybe you hadn't the previous time but this time you're looking for this 
time.” 
 
Informant13 “Yes, absolutely for sure.  I gain new knowledge. It never stops. Would make 
decision differently 10 years ago than now.  In the past, I was focused on gut 
feelings rather than facts. Gut gives you more truth in private life but not in 
business.” 
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Consistent with TNT, all managers said past experiences influence their portfolio 
decisions today.  Managers’ narratives also revealed that past experiences inform their portfolio 
decisions today.  Many of the managers adopted strategies that have worked at other firms to aid 
them in post-merger decision making at existing firms.  Most of the managers utilized past 
experiences as a mechanism for foreseeing risks and planning risk responses.   
In all instances, managers drew from past experiences to forecast the outcomes of their 
decisions.  Many managers felt past experiences helped them play out scenarios of expected 
outcomes that enabled them to make better decisions.  Lastly, when managers recalled failed 
experiences, they avoided a similar decision that led to a failed outcome.  Similarly, managers 
who experienced failed outcomes avoided similar decisions that led to the failure.  Informant5 
shared how past experiences influence his decision making today with the following explanation: 
 “If you've had trouble with one of the agency's divisions or teams, inflexibility 
from that decision, you’re not comfortable going there again. The same way if 
you've had success with a disease state or success with a group at the agency or 
success with a group of clinical researchers, it tends to become kind of a favorite 
of well I know how to do that one, I think I can do that one well. Let's go back 
and swim in that same pool again.” 
  
Informant13 discussed how his past experiences influence decisions today.  Informant13 stated 
that decisions made in the past were based on gut feelings, and decisions made today are based 
on the outcome of the past: 
“You never decide along this kind of stuff, but by the time we make decision and 
there's a thorough discussion about every single aspect, you can raise your 
opinion about it and raise your gut feeling as well based on your experience.  
But clearly the bigger value is from the facts before the gut feeling. Even in the 
past, we make decisions based on gut feelings. Today everything is more based 
on what it was in the past.”  
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Consistent with TNT, all managers made similar statements regarding how their past experiences 
influences how they make decisions today.  We posit that in the context of a merger, managers 
make decisions based upon the outcome of a decision made in a previous merger.  Even when 
evidence lends to the type of decision that should be made, managers will bypass that evidence 
and mimic the decisions from previous outcomes that were favorable.   
IV.5 Merger Impact  
 
Portfolio Growth/Decline.  Prior literature informs us that R&D portfolios shrink after 
M&A.  We asked managers: “In short, do you feel the merger will result in more or fewer drugs 
being funded, developed, and launched?”  Table 29 displays managers’ perspectives on impact 
of merger to drugs. 
Table 29 Managers’ Portfolio Forecasts Post-Merger 
Informant More or Less Drugs Theme 
Acquiring 
Informant1  
 
 
More 
 
Grows pipeline  
 
Increases revenue and investments 
 
 
 
Informant3 
Informant11 
Informant8 
   
Informant2  
Less 
 
Decreases R&D Expenditures 
 
Terminates drugs 
 
Informant4  
Informant10 
Acquired 
Informant7 
 
Less Decreases R&D expenditures and investments  
 
 
   
Informant5   
 
More 
 
Grows pipeline 
 
Enables market expansion 
 
Provides more resources 
 
Informant6  
Informant12 
Informant13 
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 Eight managers felt the merger would result in more drugs being funded, developed and 
launched, while three managers felt it would result in less drugs.  All managers, except one, from 
acquired firms felt the mergers would result in more drugs.   Four managers from acquiring firms 
felt the merger would result in more drugs, while three felt it would result in less drugs.  
 Managers who believe the merger would result in more drugs felt the mergers would 
grow the R&D pipelines. Their belief is that the merger would provide more human and capital 
resources to enhance R&D capabilities.  These managers also felt the merger would enable 
market expansion into new therapeutic areas.  The belief of these managers is that the mergers 
would make the firm bigger and less risk averse.  Informant3 mentioned that her firm’s 
willingness to accept more risks after the merger would grow the firm’s pipeline: 
“I think they're going to take risks in the future to bring these things to market 
and re-strategize how they're brought to market.”  
 
 Managers who felt the merger would result in less drugs believe the merger would 
negatively impact R&D funding.  Additionally, these managers felt drugs would be terminated 
due to overlap.  Although the portfolio would result in less drugs after the merger, Informant2 
felt that patient focus was more important than pipeline growth in terms of quantity.  She states: 
“I think it's not so much about numbers anymore. I think it really is about what 
is going to make a difference to the patient or the patient’s family, patient group 
type of scenario. I may think that market place is very different now.” 
 
 Informant1 emphasized the importance of pursuing and funding drugs that were the main 
driver of M&A.  Informant1 provided the risk in acquiring firms for the sake of portfolio growth 
without a clear strategy in his response:  
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“If you cut R&D especially along those brands, you undercut the purpose for 
acquiring those companies unlike other models where you might have come 
across this in your research where companies are just buying other companies 
and as a way, that is their R&D. They're just buying existing portfolios in 
companies and they're putting almost zero in the research and development side. 
That hasn't been our experience but I certainly know that is a model and that's 
actually an interesting model. An analogy would be if you just instead of drafting 
rookies, you just go and get free agents, right?  interesting that some companies 
are really leveraging up that way and just saying we have no R&D besides 
acquiring companies. Who knows which one will succeed or not? 
 
It’s worth mentioning that while most managers perceived that mergers would result in more 
drugs, we interpret their perspectives as looking at the new merged firm as having more drugs 
than their previous (acquired or acquiring) firm.  Further investigation into how managers 
conclude that mergers result in more drugs is needed given that evidence suggests otherwise.  
 
 Firm Challenges.  One of our final questions to managers was: “Have mergers made 
your portfolio decision making more challenging?”  We’ve charted these challenges in Table 30 
and categorized them into five categories: (a) unclear strategy, (b) hidden product issues, (c) 
termination of drugs, (d) new culture and (e) different data systems. 
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Table 30 Merger Challenges 
Informant More Challenging Theme 
Informant2 Need clarity on strategy. What does M&A look like? 
Strategic view isn't always conveyed. What opportunities are 
you seeking? 
 
Unclear 
strategy 
Informant8 The more products, the more resources are required.  Do we 
value more breadth in multiple disease areas or in one? 
 
Informant5  Competitive landscape changes dramatically.  May not make 
decisions based on current landscape.  
 
Informant1 Lack of focus on which therapeutic area to focus on.  Harder 
to get drugs approved outside of therapeutic focus. 
 
   
Informant3 Inherited issues. Legacy behind product, history of product. 
 
Hidden 
product issues 
Informant4  Lack of outside data.   
   
Informant7 Have to cut a lot of drugs.  
 
Termination 
of drugs 
Informant11 Overlapping drugs. 
   
Informant12 Decision by committee. Countless number of people 
involved.  Too much Pre-work involved.  Twenty-five chefs 
in the kitchen instead of one.  Everyone feels responsible.  
There are 20-30 people asking when, where, why, how from 
too many committees. 
 
Different 
culture  
Informant6  Making the decisions in new culture is what makes it difficult. 
   
Informant13 Acquired firms using different data analysis systems and 
tools.    
Different data 
analysis 
systems 
 
 
All managers from acquiring and acquired firms stated that mergers made their decision making 
more challenging.  Four managers’ merger challenges stemmed from not having clarity on the 
the new firm’s strategy.  These strategies included the merged firms’ focus, expected outcome, 
and resource commitments.   
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Two managers stated that the firm’s new culture made decision making complex and 
convoluted.  For these managers, the merged firms’ governance boards were too large and 
different leaders had preferences for which drugs were selected for the portfolio.  Informant12 
provided insight into the impact of having too many decision-makers: 
“You have 25 chefs in the kitchen instead of one. It's a constant struggle, because 
everyone feels as though they are the ones that are responsible for it. Every step 
and every stage you go through, you have 10 or 15 or 20 people asking you why 
and where and how come and did you do this and did you think of that.  It's a 
nonstop barrage through several different committees that you've answered the 
question four times over. You consider things and don't have it in writing and 
they keep drilling you on the same topics. It's just a lot of extra work.” 
This culture of  “decision by committee” make decision making long and frustrating. 
 
Two managers from the same acquiring firm had challenges with not knowing the true 
history of the acquired firm’s drugs.  Informant4 spoke of her firm making decisions to proceed 
with development and launch of a product with the expectation that it would generate a lot of 
revenue even when forecasted data showed that it would not.  Informant4 elaborated on this 
challenge by stating how leaders make a decision that doesn’t support the data: 
“You make this decision. You think it’s going to be a big product that will 
generate a lot of money but here is market research that's telling you it's not.” 
 
One manager from an acquiring firm experienced challenges with having a different 
system for analyzing data than that of the acquired firm.  Information between these two merged 
firms is shared by exchanging excel spreadsheets.  This manual method of information sharing 
made it difficult to analyze data in the same manner.   
 Suggested Merger Improvements.  Following our merger challenges question to 
managers, we asked managers: “What one thing would make portfolio decision making less 
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challenging?”  All managers provided suggestions for making M&A less challenging for 
decision-makers.  
 The most common feedback from five managers was the need to neutralize and 
streamline the portfolio decision-making processes.   The necessity to make unified decisions is 
critical for the success of a merged portfolio.  Managers stated that the criteria for decision 
making should be merged and adopted so that the expected outcomes can be based off of the 
same data.  The need to be objective and neutral when selecting the portfolio from the merged 
entity was also suggested.  One manager suggested that this could be best achieved by allowing a 
third party firm to make portfolio decisions after the merger.   Another manager emphasized the 
need to analyze data in the same manner after the merger.  It was also suggested that firms 
consider acquisition of firms that possess products that align with the firm’s long term goals.  
Informant1 stated that by communicating the firm’s strategy, managers can make better 
decisions.  Informant1 suggested: 
“I think in terms of portfolio management, it's helpful to have a sort of "Okay, 
here's where we're going, here's what we want to do" because then people can 
make decisions about "do we want to keep maintaining those drugs or keep any 
effort around those drugs or not."  
 
 The second most common feedback from three managers was the need to explore the true 
costs of the acquisition.  These costs included cost of the merger and R&D development. 
Managers suggested that the acquiring firm ensure there is adequate cash reserves to fund the 
merger and sustain R&D after the merger.    Managers advised that acquiring firms should look 
at synergies and acquire firms that help close the gap and meet long team goals.  Informant7 
provided what he felt was key to maximizing synergies.   Informant7 advised: 
  
99 
“If you have a merger and you already have an ophthalmic group and then you 
buy another ophthalmic group, then there's obviously going to be layoffs in both 
groups for you to get that synergy and those are the ones that are the most 
difficult. That's where you make the most mistakes.”  
 
Informant7 recommends firms engage in what he calls a “bolt-on’ merger, where its buys and 
acquires a new company and add it to something to complete the gap.  Informant7 provided an 
example of a pharma firm with an ophthalmic unit buying another ophthalmic unit that 
completed or extended the ophthalmic portfolio.   Further, managers suggested that firms 
consider the risks of cutting early stage R&D development to gain short-term wins with later 
stage developments.  It was also suggested that R&D personnel not be eliminated after the 
merger so that knowledge is not not lost during merger activities. 
Another common suggestion from two managers was to perform due diligence on the 
firm to be acquired before the merger.  Managers also suggested that decision-makers 
aggressively explore all of the data for the drugs being acquired.   Managers from acquiring 
firms suggested that acquired firms be transparent and forthcoming about potential drug issues. 
Informant6 stated that it is important for leaders to practice transparency at the firm level. 
Informant 6 revealed: 
“Transparency as a leader behavior within the organization would actually help 
in decision making because there is nothing to hide. People are very transparent 
about what's going on and sharing the information and the facts to a point where 
we could really make a decision. There are other factors as well, since you asked 
for one I'm saying transparency.”  
 
Although managers demonstrated some level of frustration with pharma mergers, it was 
interesting that none of them suggested that mergers cease.  Instead, all of them openly provided 
suggestions for making M&A better.  This observation signals that managers feel mergers can 
result in firm growth if firms look deeper into its merger strategies and make the necessary 
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adjustments to enhance merger effectiveness. We have included managers’ suggestions for 
improving merger acvtivities in Table 31. 
 
Table 31 Suggested Improvements for Merger Effectiveness 
Informant Suggested Improvements Theme 
Informant2 Look at clinical phase programs. Consider development costs.  
Too much focus on enhancing R&D capabilities. 
 
Explore true 
lifecycle 
costs 
 Informant7  Get the synergies. Create savings to fund merger (usually done by 
shaving resources).  Keep productive paths of R&D groups intact. 
 
When R&D takes a cut, future developments are at risk.  Don’t 
kills everything in early stage R&D. 
 
Don’t get rid of R&D staff that knows most about the asset.  
 
Informant8 At pre-clinical stage, make tougher decisions early on. New 
indications. Make decision if we can afford the investment.  
Informant 3 Be transparent.  Perform Due diligence. Research the agency. 
 
Transparency 
 
Informant6  Transparency – know what's really going on.  Share the facts. 
 
Informant4  Outside data would make it more successful. Expand knowledge 
if successful.  
 
Due 
Diligence 
Informant5  Equivalent information across both firms so that the team are 
making decisions from the same depth.  Ability to gain seamless 
equivalent basis of knowledge.  Bring forward streamlined 
portfolio decisions templates. Unified decisions. 
 
Neutralize 
and 
streamline 
portfolio 
decision-
making 
process 
 
Informant11  Have 3rd party do the evaluation for portfolio selection. 
 
Informant12 More streamlined approach. Less people making decisions. Right 
people involved in decision making.   
 
Decision-makers weighted towards acquiring firm. 
 
Informant13 If companies share same systems, data analysis done the same 
way. Data and optimization would make it better. Long process to 
connect all internal systems to one.  One service organization 
with long-term outlook.   
 
Informant1 Inherit products that are part of firm’s long-term goals. Can make 
better decisions about keeping and maintaining drugs. 
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V DISCUSSION 
 
The findings from this study address the research question: How do pharmaceutical 
managers make portfolio decisions during a merger?  In this section, we conclude our learnings 
and collectively reveal insights gained by listening to managers and analyzing their responses 
through the lens of TNT.  We discuss contributions to the area of PfM by discussing the gaps in 
the literature that lack how pharma managers actually make portfolio decisions during merger 
activities. Further, we provide suggestions for how pharma firms could approach future M&A such 
that R&D portfolios are not negatively impacted.   We also provide managerial implications and 
limitations of the study. Lastly, we provide a reflection of the engaged scholarship experience from 
a practitioner’s perspective.  
V.1 Decision Making and Goal Alignment 
 
Many pharmaceutical news outlets report M&A activity, including predictions for rumored 
acquisitions of giant firms buying smaller or competitor firms.  Within these outlets, the acquiring 
firms consistently report the goal of the M&A as an attempt to grow the firm’s pipeline and 
enhance R&D capabilities.  The findings from this study support this claim, in that the overall goal 
of a merger is to achieve firm growth.  Other goals, such as acquiring a new footprint and 
advancing into new therapeutic areas, also align with prior literature on the goals of M&A.  Firms 
aim to be long-term focused pre- and post-merger, with great intent to enhance R&D capabilities.  
Firms aim to make these goals attainable.  
Although firms share a common goal to enhance the pipeline by engaging in M&A, their 
goals change after the merger.   Through exploration, we’ve discovered that the strategy of the 
firm is changed by the new leadership of the merged firm.  Firms also become more R&D driven 
with the new leadership team.  Although financial growth is still the ultimate goal of firms, a new 
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goal emerged that also focuses on patient disease.  Also, firms are focused on the expansion of 
therapeutic areas. 
Managers in this study said they align decisions with their firms’.  While this is evident 
under pre-merger conditions, managers deviate from alignment with firm goals when making 
decisions under post-merger conditions.  One possible explanation for this finding is that most 
managers, along with the firm, change their goals after a merger.  We suggest that the complexity 
of a firm’s post-merger goal realignment, coupled with a more career-focused manager, 
contributes to a misalignment of firm/manager goals.  As a result, managers guide their decisions 
heavily based upon what they feel would benefit their career and lead to job security.  Manager’s 
post-merger focus on careers could interfere with their ability to make more rational decisions 
during a merger. 
V.2 Managers’ Portfolio Perspectives  
  
 With a common goal to achieve firm growth, we gained insight into how managers view 
their firm’s portfolio condition pre- merger, as well as their expectations of the portfolio post- 
merger.  We found that the majority of managers from acquiring and acquired firms predicted 
that their firm’s portfolio would have more drugs funded, developed, and launched as a result of 
the merger.   Very few managers predicted a decline in the merged portfolio, despite the 
literature’s claim that R&D expenditures and pipelines typically decrease after M&A.  One 
possible explanation for this perspective is that managers engage in system one thinking, where 
fast, contextual stories lead them astray because they are not aware of their own errors 
(Kahneman, Lovallo, & Sibony, 2011).  Managers subconsciously envision the coupling of two 
firms’ portfolios, which logically would result in two portfolios within one firm.  Managers 
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imagine the merged firm as having more drugs and capabilities.  This explanation is supported 
by responses from two informants in this study.  Informant 13 states: 
 “I will say, more drugs, better drugs, more revenue and better cash 
flows.  Could think less because you clear out the portfolio first and you look for 
redundancies. You don't keep everything that was there in the past but then 
there's the joined forces, you can do better and you can do more.” 
 
Informant6 states: 
“The beginning of the merger will always look like it's more, but then it balances 
out.” 
  
Both managers’ initial responses were that the merged firm’s portfolio would result in more 
drugs.  However, the latter part of their responses supports system two thinking, where they 
reflect and think about how the portfolio would actually result in fewer drugs.  Throughout this 
study, we have consistently discovered contradictions where managers’ perspectives and actual 
behaviors differ.  
We researched financial performance of firms in this study and found that half of the 
firms’ revenues declined post-merger.   We found that smaller pharma firms experienced more 
growth than larger pharma firms.  FierceBiotech reported that the pharmaceutical giant Pfizer, 
since its mergers, has been mired by poor performance in R&D for more than a decade (“What 
can Gilead, Biogen, and Celgene teach Big Pharma,” 2015).  Despite prior research on 
pharmaceutical M&A, firms still believe they will grow after M&A, especially within R&D. 
Consistent with TNT, managers forecast the future condition of the portfolio based on their 
past experiences with M&A within their existing or past firms. It was discovered that managers, 
prior to making a prediction, recall events of past mergers failures or successes, and form an 
opinion about a future outcome based on that experience.  
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Managers also have a notion that the future of a portfolio is heavily based on luck.  This 
belief is consistent with Cohen, March, and Olsen (1972) who state that often what gets decided 
depends strongly upon timing and luck.  Managers feel that even when evidence shows that drugs 
have a promising future and are selected for a portfolio, they could potentially result in failed 
performance.   A possible explanation for this occurrence is the manager’s limited focus on 
adherence to standardized process and methods for portfolio selections.   March (1991) states that 
organization decision making involves more than just valuation methods and processes.  March 
(1991) also states that decision-makers are forced to make decisions based on information provided 
to them and that better decisions are be made when a holistic view is granted.  We posit that 
managers’ decisions should go beyond portfolio selection.  Managers should also contribute 
towards decisions regarding the merger strategy of the firm so that a more holistic approach to 
portfolio decision making can be taken.   
It is worth mentioning that portfolio forecasts can differ between managers within the same 
firm. We discovered that managers from different functional areas within the same firm had 
differing opinions of the firm’s pre- and post-merger portfolio condition. This finding suggests 
that individuals have their own internal pre-defined criteria for defining a successful portfolio.  
Given this, even prescribed decision-making methods cannot ensure an unbiased, objective 
approach to portfolio decision making.  This could be a key discovery as to why R&D portfolios 
decline after M&A.  If standard methods and processes are followed, the introduction of biases 
into the portfolio decision-making process could be detrimental to a firm if managers’ goals are 
not aligned with the firms’.  Depending upon managers’ attitudes about the merger and their 
personal values, their goals can vary.  One informant from this study reveals that his personal goals 
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are influenced by how he envisions the future.  Informant7 says the following when asked if his 
personal goals had changed post-merger: 
“I guess it depended on how you felt about the mergers and acquisitions and 
whether you the acquiree or the acquirer, and how you were personally affected 
by it. If you were treated well and promoted or given a good position at the 
merger and acquisition, then obviously you were going to feel a lot better about 
it. Your goals were going to be good.”  
 
Managers’ interests align with that of the firms’.  However, as the informant above 
suggests, their goals change after the merger.  Post-merger, managers seek to gain more 
experience by securing new roles within the merged firm in efforts to expand their 
knowledge. This suggests that managers align their portfolio decisions with their personal 
goals.  This discovery helps explain why portfolios decline post-merger, in that managers’ 
biases could negatively impact the portfolio decision-making process.  This claim is 
supported by Kahneman et al. (2011), who reveals a study by McKinsey where more than 
1,000 major business investments showed that when organizations worked at reducing 
the effect of bias in their decision-making processes, they achieve returns up to seven 
percentage points higher.  
V.3 Decision-Making Processes and Methods 
 
The decision-making processes are relatively the same across firms pre- and post-merger.  
Firms institute a governance board of functional leaders and investors to make final portfolio 
decisions.   Managers follow the traditional economical decision-making processes and methods 
as outlined in the literature.  Managers also partake in the traditional annual portfolio review 
meetings, and assess market conditions to assist with prioritizing the portfolio.  Most managers 
feel methods are effective.  We confirmed that methods were most effective when an evidence-
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based approach is taken, and when there is transparency with the data.  When buy-in is obtained 
across multiple functional areas, better decisions can be made because of the varying 
perspectives of drug’s potential risks and growth opportunities.       
Decision-making methods are ineffective when there is a failure to integrate the culture 
and systems used to analyze drug data.  We learned that the culture of a newly merged pharma 
firm is highly political and sometimes negatively influences portfolio decisions.   This finding is 
consistent with experimental evidence provided by Weber and Camerer (as cited by Oh et al., 
2014), that the conflict between the organizational culture of two firms involved in a merger can 
contribute to post-merger performance deterioration.   The complexity of the integration from the 
merger contributes towards method ineffectiveness because the acquiring firm’s leadership team 
dominate the decision-making process by bypassing the processes set forth by the firm’s 
governance board.   
We observed that managers do not always rely on processes and methods to aid in 
portfolio decision making.   Our study reveals that the legacy and new management team rely 
heavily on intuition as a method for making portfolio decisions during merger activities.  This 
approach is consistent with the pyramid of decision approaches presented by Schoemaker and 
Russo (1993), where intuitive decision-making is often undertaken when faced with pressure and 
complexities as a result of mergers.  The reliance on intuitive decision making by leaders often 
interfered with evidence-based recommendations brought forth by managers.  They sometimes 
follow gut feelings, and seek out drugs that align with their own personal interests.  One 
informant mentioned that managers within his firm treat drugs like their babies.  He states: 
“These research programs become people's children, their babies. If somebody 
had a personal investment in an idea, it's very hard to give that up.” 
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This statement suggests that managers seek further development of drugs they’ve envisioned to 
succeed, despite evidence-based data that suggest otherwise.   Managers fall into this confirming 
evidence trap, which Hammond, Keeney, and Raiffa (2006) defines as seeking out information 
that supports managers’ existing instincts or point of view while avoiding information that 
contradicts it.  Through the lens of TNT, managers engage in this type behavior when they’ve 
experienced previous success in continuing on with development of less than promising drugs or 
with drugs that seemed promising pre-merger.  This behavior leads to R&D investments that are 
potentially wasted on drugs that may never produce long-term value.  Over time, R&D budgets 
diminish and long-term investments can no longer be funded.   For this reason, R&D portfolios 
decline. 
When there are changes in the decision-making processes and methods post-merger, they 
tend to be drastic.  Pre-merger processes of less experienced pharma firms involve a small 
number of decision-making executives who make ad-hoc decisions based upon external 
influences, with no buy-in from other internal managers.  Post-merger, firms adopt a more 
traditional approach to decision making.  However, the new leadership team of the merged firm 
is prone to take a biased approach towards portfolio selection.  Despite the evidence-based 
recommendations for the merged portfolio, managers tend to terminate early-stage development 
and focus more on the later stage ones that could launch to market faster.  This action contradicts 
the stated goals of the firm’s post-merger long-term focus on R&D and the goal of the merger to 
enhance R&D capabilities.  Hitt, Hoskisson, and Ireland (1990) states that if top-level managers 
have a low commitment to innovation, they will provide few rewards and incentives for creating 
and championing innovations.   This supports our finding that managers consider what’s 
personally at stake for them when making portfolio decisions.  Managers sometimes select drugs 
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for a portfolio that are championed by senior managers who have direct influence over their 
careers.   Further, we observed that managers will not reveal all of the evidence for a drug that 
has potential issues when they know investors and executives are in favor of it.  We propose that 
this behavior occurs when managers fear their reputation or job will be negatively impacted.  
Paese, Bieser, and Tubbs (1993) identify this behavior as framing, where managers avoid risk 
when they perceive having something to gain.  We posit that managers will not position a drug 
for a portfolio if they do not feel they have anything to gain.    
V.4 Making Decisions under Uncertainty 
 
 There is a change in a firm’s risk aversion after the merger.  Large acquiring firms tend to 
become more risk-averse after M&A.  Acquiring firms are less supportive of taking risks and 
became more conscious of them post-merger.  Informant7 from the acquiring firm, PharmaZeta, 
stated that large acquiring firms take less risks: 
“I think as a general statement, the larger a company is, the more risk averse it 
gets.”  
 
This claim is supported by Hitt et al. (1990), who found that large firms are more risk-averse than 
risk–taking after an acquisition.  A noteworthy change in firms as it relates to risk is that risk 
management is implemented across all brands post-merger, versus a pre-merger risk focus on 
blockbuster drugs.  Contrary to Hammond et al. (2006) who stated acquired firms find themselves 
stuck in the status quo trap after a merger because they don’t want to rock the boat, half of the 
acquired firms in this study become less risk averse post-merger.  More importantly, more acquired 
firms also experienced post-merger growth than acquiring firms.   
 
  
109 
The literature suggests that managers’ risk tolerances align with that of the firms’. We 
examined managers’ approaches to risks while making decisions when faced with uncertainty and 
discovered that more than half of the managers became less risk-averse when making difficult 
decisions during merger activities.   Further, managers put the firms’ portfolios at risk, as well as 
their jobs, financial rewards, and reputation.  A possible explanation for this behavior is a finding 
by Paese et al. (1993) that reveal managers seek risks when they perceive they have something to 
lose.   We posit that when faced with uncertainty during a merger, the negative framing that prior 
mergers have presented sparks an insecurity in managers, causing them to make irrational 
decisions.  This behavior could negatively impact a firm’s portfolio, given that evidence from 
Eisenhardt (1985) (as cited by Hitt et al., 1990) suggests that financial performance outcomes are 
a function of managerial behavior.   
V.5 How Managers Make Portfolio Decisions 
 
This study addresses a gap in the literature that, to our knowledge, does not reveal how 
managers actually make pharma portfolio decisions during a merger.  Our evidence reveals that 
managers make decisions by first recalling positive and negative outcomes from previous 
mergers and other work experience.  These past experiences are then utilized to plan risk 
responses that will dictate their decisions.  Managers use their imagination to plan scenarios for 
both negative and positive outcomes.  Managers constantly align their personal goals, such a 
career growth, with how they feel the merged portfolios will perform.  If they feel the portfolio 
will not succeed, they seek out opportunities to learn new areas of the merged firm before 
restructuring occurs that usually results in workforce reduction and R&D site closures.  If the 
merged portfolio looks promising, they align themselves within the firm where they feel there’s 
job security.   
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  With the expectation of a promising future, managers are more risk conscious when 
making decisions, and continuously adjust their decisions until the portfolio seems attractive.  
While making these decisions, managers consider the risks to their reputation, financial stability, 
and career.  On occasion, managers “ethically manipulate” data to influence senior managers’ 
final decision.  According to Paese et al. (1993), this positive framing is a risk aversion behavior 
that managers demonstrate when they seek to gain something such as financial rewards, esteem 
or job promotion.  
Managers consider job stability when making portfolio decisions. When they feel the 
decision outcome may not be favorable, they leave the firm before the decision outcome is 
realized.  Managers feel they lose before the merger even takes place when they foresee 
uncertainty with the merger.  This finding addresses the gap in the literature that calls for the 
investigation of managers’ motives during decision making, as identified by Walter and Barney 
(1990).   We support the views of Schweizer and Patzelt (2012) that overcoming managers’ 
perceptions of uncertainty during the post-acquisition period is central to their firm commitment.  
V.6 Merger Decision-Making Challenges 
  
We’ve identified five distinct challenges that encumber managers’ portfolio decisions: (1) 
unclear strategy, which entails lack of clarity in merger strategy and lack of focus on which 
therapeutic area(s) to focus on; (2) hidden drug issues, which involves that lack of transparency 
from the acquired firms in disclosing known product issues and the legacy of the product; (3) 
termination of R&D drugs, which usually results in the termination of the wrong overlapping 
drug, or drugs that require long-term development; (4) new culture, which lacks integration of 
processes and a dominating decision-making process from the leadership team of the acquiring 
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firm; and (5) different data analysis systems, which forces the acquiring firms to interpret 
portfolio data from a different analytics tool with different portfolio decision-making criteria.  
These challenges make managerial decision making more difficult and prolongs the 
process of portfolio selection.  We offer suggestions for overcoming these challenges in a later 
section.  
V.7 Key Findings 
  
 This study explored how managers make portfolio decisions during a merger.  We’ve 
presented our findings and have discussed our interpretation of managers’ perspectives through 
the lens of TNT.  A few key themes emerged from this study that are worth mentioning.   
 
Rigor and Lack of Integration.  Since methods and processes remained about the same 
throughout the merger, we speculate that they were applied with greater rigor and lacked 
integration.  This is evident by the recurring challenges revealed by managers that exacerbated 
decision-making during mergers.  Expansion in the number of managers making decisions for 
one portfolio from two merged firms created cultural conflicts that prolonged decision making.  
Since the merged firm comprises of decision-making managers from acquired and acquiring 
firms, the new governance board demanded a more thorough product analyses due to an 
imbalance in knowledge about the history and performance of the drugs.  The merged firm’s 
CEO was likely focused more on ROI, which forced managers to terminate or divest risky drugs.  
As a result, fewer drugs made it to late stage development which resulted in a decline in the 
R&D portfolio. 
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 Biases.  Throughout this study, we observed that managers were unaware of their own 
biases. There was disparity in managers’ perspectives and their actual behaviors.  Managers felt 
they were objective and unbiased when making portfolio decisions.  Although they felt politics, 
culture, and post-integration challenges made their decision making difficult, they did not 
demonstrate they were aware that these challenges impacted their decision outcomes.  Further, 
they did not feel the merger affected their decision making.  For example, all of the managers 
stated adherence to standard decision-making processes, methods, evidence-based decisions, and 
alignment with firm goals.  However, when faced with uncertainty, all of the managers admitted 
that past experiences influenced their decision making.  Further, many of the managers stated 
that they are guided by their intuition and gut feelings when making portfolio decisions.  
Additionally, all of the managers stated that something was personally at stake for them when 
making portfolio decisions.  Managers’ biases can impact their portfolio decisions.  Until 
managers are aware of these biases, they will not consciously take measures to minimize them. 
Unless these biases are addressed, firms may continue to see a decline in R&D portfolios. 
  
 Differing Portfolio Perspectives.  Managers had an overwhelming difference in 
perspectives of the condition of the firms’ current and future portfolios.  Twice, we found that 
managers within the same firm viewed the pre- and post-merger condition of their firm’s 
portfolio differently.  This finding erupted an alarming theme since all managers claimed to 
measure portfolios against standard criteria.  If the portfolio criteria within firms are the same, 
how could managers have varying perspectives on its condition?   The different within-firm 
perspectives pose a problem for decision making because managers inject their internal criteria 
into the portfolio decision-making process.    By doing so makes it impossible to objectively 
evaluate a portfolio and maintain neutrality in portfolio selections.  Further, managers within the 
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same firms had different perspectives on the firm’s goal focus.  Managers who view their firms 
as long-term focused will likely favor early-stage developments, while managers who view their 
term as short-term focused will likely favor later- stage developments.  A lack of unified 
portfolio success criteria makes it impossible for managers within the same firm to evaluate 
portfolios in a similar manner. 
V.8 Managerial Implications 
 
Mergers and acquisitions will not cease within the near future for the pharma industry.  
Pipelines may continue to be affected if firms fail to adjust their R&D strategies when engaging 
in merger activities.  We’ve captured some suggestions that may aid firms and managers in 
overcoming decision-making challenges during merger activities.   
First, we suggest that firms neutralize and streamline the portfolio decision-making 
process during merger activities so that decision-making criteria from the acquired and acquiring 
firms can be weighed against the same criteria.  We’ve concluded from our findings that 
portfolio selection during merger activities is best accomplished by allowing a third party firm to 
make recommendations for the merged portfolio. 
Second, prior to the acquisition, investors and finance teams should consider the true 
costs of the acquisition, which include inherent costs of the merger and R&D sustainability. We 
suggest that the M&A strategy team seek to fulfill a capability or product gap when engaging in 
M&A activities, rather than a quest to target acquisition of a competitor in efforts to dominate 
the market.  Long-term growth and patient focus should be an integral part of the merger 
strategy. 
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Lastly, due diligence should be as granular as possible to uncover hidden product issues.  
Firms should equip their staff to audit laboratory notebooks, regulatory submittals, raw data from 
all development phases (Phase I, II, III and clinical) and patient complaints.   
V.9 Contribution to Knowledge 
We contribute to the literature on portfolio management by explaining how portfolio 
decisions made during a merger could attribute to the disruption of R&D portfolios after M&A.  
We also provide suggestions to help minimize these disruptions.  Our research provides insight 
into the actual cognition of the managers making portfolio decisions, and identify what elements 
go beyond their thoughts.  Our findings provide insight into what actually influences the 
behaviors of the managers that make portfolio decisions, and how these behaviors motivate their 
decisions.  We determined what changes occur within the portfolio management process after the 
merger that could possibly impact the way decisions are made during a merger.  Our insights 
reveal what could account for the shrinkage of a portfolio, in terms of managerial decision 
making.  
V.10 Limitations 
A limitation of our research is that it includes managers from both the acquiring and 
acquired pharmaceutical firms with varying sizes.   Another limitation is that this study uses a 
qualitative approach of inquiry.  This study does not include a quantitative or mixed methods 
approach.  Sampling presents a limitation since a small sample of 13 informants was used in this 
study.  Lastly, this study includes pharmaceutical firms that specialize in human drug products.  
Veterinarian pharmaceutical firms were excluded from this study.  
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V.11 Future Research 
  
 Researchers could apply a quantitative approach to measure pre- and post-merger R&D 
portfolio performance against portfolio decisions.  A longitudinal study could be conducted to 
look at R&D pipeline selection against performance after M&A.   A quantitative research study 
could be conducted to determine if M&A changes the risk-taking culture within a firm.   
 
V.12 Conclusion 
  
 While managers apply financial-based approaches to portfolio decision making, the 
interplay of manager and firm goals heavily influence their decisions during a merger.  The 
empirical findings from this qualitative study suggest that many influences, such as personal 
goals, biases, integration complexity, risk aversion, culture, and new leadership impact how 
managers make portfolio decisions.   We contribute to the literature on portfolio management by 
providing insight into how pharma managers make portfolio decisions in the context of a merger.   
Three key findings emerged from this study. First, rigor and lack of integration in 
decision-making processes influence managers’ decisions.  Second, managers are unaware of the 
biases that adulterate their decisions. Their perspectives on how they make decisions differ from 
reality. Third, managers inject their personal criterion, along with the firms’, into portfolio 
evaluations when making decisions. 
Through exploration of TNT, we provide insight on how pharma managers actually make 
portfolio decisions in the context of a merger.   Prior to the merger, managers form an opinion of 
how the merged portfolio will perform.  Based on their attitude about the merger, they adjust 
their risk aversion according to what leads to better job security, career growth, and financial 
rewards.  Through their past experiences with M&A, managers recall experiences and guide their 
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portfolio decisions to align with prior favorable outcomes.  Managers rely on their intuition and 
gut feelings to inform their propensity to take more or fewer risks.  
Most managers predicted that M&A would result in more drugs despite evidence that 
R&D performance decline post-merger.  Half of the firms in this study experienced a decline in 
revenue post-merger.  Smaller firms experienced revenue growth.   
Since the economy will continue to dictate merger activity, firms should consider 
adjusting their acquisition strategy to include R&D pipeline development.   Firms should 
implement strategies to overcome merger challenges and balance out decision-making power.  
Finally, firms should consider long-term growth during portfolio selection instead of a quest to 
gain short-term wins. 
V.13 Engaged Scholarship Perspective 
 
 As a present day portfolio management consultant and former R&D scientist, it was 
interesting to uncover the hidden influences on my decision making.  Prior to this study, I was 
unaware of my biases.  I considered myself as an evidence-based practitioner who made 
decisions based solely on facts.  When I played a role in a pharmaceutical merger, I experienced 
some challenges but didn’t have the knowledge or insight to attribute it to lack of integration.  I 
viewed challenges as growing pains.  Interestingly, I believed that I’d based decisions on facts.   
However, throughout this research endeavor, I’ve recalled instances where I’d certainly framed 
R&D studies to align with the goals of my leader.  The insight gained from this study has truly 
made me a better portfolio decision-maker today.   
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
Exhibit A-1: Compositional Style Elements 
(Mathiassen, Chiasson, and Germonprez (2012), Mathiassen (2015)) 
A (Area of Concern) Portfolio Management  
 
P (Problem Setting) Pharmaceutical Research and Development (R&D) 
Portfolio Management  
 
F (Conceptual 
Framework) 
Theory of Narrative Thought (Decision-Making Theory)   
 
RQ (Research Question) How do pharmaceutical R&D managers make portfolio 
decisions during a merger? 
 
M (Research Method) A qualitative, multiple-case study with the R&D portfolio 
managers as the unit of observation 
 
C (Contribution) C(Fa):  Deep Dive into Post-Merger Pharmaceutical R&D 
Portfolio Management to provide empirical insights into 
what’s actually being done during portfolio decision 
making 
 
C(P):  Plausible Explanations for shrinkage of R&D 
Portfolios 
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Exhibit A-2: Antecedents of TNT  
(Beach, 2010) 
Theory Description Reference 
Image The basic idea of image theory is that that your store of 
knowledge can be partitioned into three image categories: 
value, trajectory, and image, because they are your vision 
of what constitutes a valuable and properly ordered 
course of events. Image theory posits two kinds of 
decisions: adoption decisions and progress decisions. The 
former is about adding new goals or plans to the 
trajectory and strategic images; the latter is about 
evaluating the progress of plan implementation toward 
goals. 
Beach 1990 
Mitchell 1990 
Recognition Assumes that the context in which a decision is to be 
made provides information that allows the decision maker 
to access his or her past experience and existing store of 
knowledge in order to determine what to do 
Simon 1979 
Klein 1993 
Klein 1996 
Scenario Describes how plausible stories can be constructed to 
forecast the future and guide planning. 
Jungermann 
1985 
Thüring 1987 
Explanation Interprets and evaluates new information to integrate it 
with their general knowledge about human behavior into 
an evolving explanation about what happened and why. 
Pennington 
and Hastie 
1986, 
1988,1992 
Argument The central idea of these theories is that the decision 
maker assesses the decision situation and, drawing upon 
past experience and general knowledge, formulates a 
course of action that meets the demands of the situation. 
Lipshitz 1993 
Svenson 1992 
Montgomery 
1993 
Reflexivity The idea is that that decisions produce changes the 
market, which in turn changes subsequent decision 
behavior.  
Soros 2008 
Incremental Incremental evaluation is reflected in the idea that plans 
to address the undesirable (flawed) portions of a 
forecasted future (to “repair” the forecast), with the result 
that, when it arrives, the actual future usually is not all 
that radically different from the forecast, improved but 
still much the same. Incremental implementation is 
reflected in the idea that feedback during plan 
implementation allows the decision maker to take stock 
and adjust what he or she is doing—sometimes changing 
direction if necessary or stopping if the result is good 
enough. 
Lindbloom 
1959 
Connolly 1988 
Deontology Influence of moral obligation and commitment on human 
behavior. 
Etizioni 1988, 
1993 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Exhibit B-1: Interview Protocol  
(Adapted from Kester et al. (2011) 
 
Interview Protocol  
 
1. Introduction by interviewer 
An electronic recording device will be used to capture the content of this interview.  This 
recording will remain confidential, and will only be accessible to myself.  Your responses will 
be assigned a code using random numbers and letter that will only be known by the 
investigators.  The recordings and documentation from this interview will be kept on an 
encrypted hard drive until the conclusion of this study.  You should have received a copy of 
my informed consent document informing you of the following: (1) your participation in this 
study is strictly voluntary and that you may terminate this interview at any time, (2) content 
from this interview will not be shared with other interviewees within this study, and anonymity 
will be maintained for the reporting of this study, and (3) there is not intent to inflict any harm.  
Your signature and transmittance of this form to me indicates that you understand the terms of 
this research and your rights as a participant.   
 
We will begin the interview shortly. You have been selected to interview as a result of your 
role in the portfolio management process at ______________ pharmaceutical.   Our research 
study will focus on the decision making of managers during a pharmaceutical merger. I will 
ask you approximately 9 questions that contain a set of sub-questions.  These questions will be 
divided into 3 parts.  Part I will focus on the organizational aspect of portfolio management.  
Part II will focus on the portfolio valuation and selection methods adopted by your firm.  
Finally, part III will focus on how you personally manage portfolios (i.e. decision making, 
selection, etc.).  The interview will be interactive and engaging.  Please feel free to answer 
freely.  There are no right or wrong answers.  I am interested in your perspectives and insights.  
The duration of this interview should span between 45-60 minutes. In the event that the 
interview time is elapsed, I will ask your permission to continue or request to schedule a 
follow-up interview.   Thank you for your participation in this research study. 
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Part I.  Organizational Context and Processes 
 
2. Role and responsibilities 
2.1. What is your role within firm X? 
2.2. How long have you been with the firm? 
2.3. Are you from the acquired or the acquiring firm?  
 
3. Merger Impact on Portfolio Management 
3.1. What do you think led to the merger that has taken place within your organization? 
3.2. What is your view of the condition in which the firm’s portfolio is in today? 
3.3. What do you think will happen to the portfolio in the future? 
 
4. Portfolio Decision Processes 
4.1. Can you describe how portfolio decision-making processes within firm X work?  
4.1.1. How did this process work before the merger? 
4.2. How are portfolio decisions governed within your firm?  
4.2.1. How were these decisions governed before the merger? 
4.3. How was the portfolio selection process before the merger? 
4.4. How is the portfolio selection process now?  
 
5. Organization and Individual goals? 
5.1. Have the goals of the merged firm changed?  
5.1.1. If so, how? 
5.2. Have your personal goals changed since the firm has merged? If so, what changed and 
why? 
5.3. Is the firm’s goal long or short-termed focused? 
5.3.1. Has your firm’s goal changed since the merger? i.e. short vs. long 
5.4. Do you feel your firm’s goals are attainable? 
 
Part II.  Portfolio Management  
6. Methods 
6.1. What kinds of methods are being used within firm X for making portfolio decisions? 
6.1.1. Were these same methods used before the merger? 
6.1.2. Do you feel these methods are effective? 
 
7. Portfolio Selection 
7.1. Can you describe a recent portfolio decision?  
7.1.1. What was your role in the decision making? 
7.1.2. What influenced this decision? 
7.1.2.1. Did the merger influence this decision? 
7.1.2.2. Would this decision have been different before the merger? 
7.1.3. Who was involved in making the decision? 
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8. Dealing with Uncertainty and Complexity 
8.1. Is your firm more risk adverse post-merger as you were pre-merger? 
8.2. Can you describe a situation in which you were confronted with a difficult portfolio 
decision during the merger?  
8.2.1. Why was this decision difficult?  
8.2.2. Were you satisfied with the decision? 
Part III.  Individual Behaviors 
9. Individual Portfolio Decisions Aspects 
9.1. Do you think your past experiences influences your portfolio decisions now? 
9.2. Are you rewarded for the decisions you make? 
9.3. What is personally at stake when making portfolio decisions? 
 
10. Closing Questions 
10.1. In short, do you feel the merger will result in more or fewer drugs being funded, 
developed, and launched? 
10.2. Have mergers made your portfolio decision-making more challenging? If so, what 
one thing would make these decisions less challenging? 
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APPENDIX C 
Exhibit C-1: Case Selection Criteria 
 
Number Factor Criteria 
1 Acquired Manager from a firm that acquired another firm. 
2 Acquired Manager from a firm acquired by another firm. 
3 Horizontal 
Merger 
Manager was employed during a merger that occurred 
between two firms within the same sector (pharmaceutical 
industry). 
4 Industry Manager was from one or more of the following industries:  
Pharmaceutical, Biotech 
5 Decision-
maker 
Manager makes R&D portfolio decisions. 
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APPENDIX D 
 
Exhibit D-1:  Quality of Case Study Research 
(Adapted from Yin 2014) 
 
Criteria Rationale 
Justification for case 
research 
A statement of why the case method was adopted appeared in the 
research together with a clear explanation of why the case research 
method is appropriate.  
Reasoning for using a 
case research method 
provided.  
A statement of why case method was used. 
Unit of analysis  Unit of analysis explicitly stated 
Theory vs. 
phenomenon 
Was the research grounded in existing theory or phenomenon? 
Sampling strategy How did the researcher(s) decide on which case(s) to choose? 
Number of cases How many cases were examined in the research? 
Triangulated data 
sources 
Was there more than one source of data used to validate the research 
findings? 
Data analysis  How were the research results presented? 
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APPENDIX E 
Exhibit E-1:  Informed Consent Document 
 
 
Informed Consent 
  
Title:  Managing Pharmaceutical Research and Development Portfolios: An Empirical 
Inquiry into Managerial Decision Making in the Context of a Merger 
 
Principal Investigator: Danny Bellenger, PhD. 
Student, Principal Investigator: Catrina Jones 
  
I. Purpose & Procedure 
You are invited to participate in a research study because you have been identified at a portfolio 
decision-maker residing in the R&D, marketing functions or portfolio management functions.  
Your participation is voluntary and information obtained from this study will be anonymous and 
confidential.  The purpose of this study is to explore the behaviors and actions of managers while 
navigating throughout the portfolio management process.  The initial interview will request 
approximately 60-90 minutes of your time. 
  
II. Procedure 
If your decision is to participate in this research study, you will be asked to meet with the 
researcher (and possibly a research assistant) for an information-gathering interview via phone 
and face-to-face.  This interview will be conducted in a private session, either in the participant’s 
office or another setting suitable for private conversation free of interruption and eavesdropping.  
Interview sessions will be scheduled and conducted according to the participant’s and 
researcher’s mutual availability.  The researcher will make every effort to give preference of 
time and location to the participants’ needs when possible.   
 
You will be asked a series of questions that you will be allowed to answer freely.  Your 
responses will be written in a notebook and electronically recorded.  The researcher may alter the 
interview questions based on your responses, but will remain within the interview protocol 
established for this research study.     Periodically you may be asked to repeat or clarify your 
responses.  The purpose of this request is to provide clarity and understanding to the researcher.  
Once all of the questions have been addressed, the researcher will review her notes with you to 
ensure your responses have been accurately captured. 
  
III. Risks and Benefits 
For this study, no foreseen risks have been identified other than those that could occur in 
everyday life.  Your participation may not benefit you personally, but we are hoping that our 
findings provide insights on how mangers make R&D portfolio decisions after a pharmaceutical 
merger.  These insights may aid in providing gaps in the portfolio management process that 
attribute to the decline of R&D productivity after a merger. 
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IV.  Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal 
Participation in this research is voluntary. You are not required to participate in this research 
study.  Your decision regarding participation will not be shared with your employer. If you 
decide to participate in this research study and change your decision, you have the right to 
terminate your participation at any time. You may opt out of questions and exit the survey 
without any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
  
V.  Confidentiality 
Your records will be kept private to the extent allowed by law. The principal and student 
investigator, as well as a research assistant, will have access to the information you provide.  
Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (Georgia 
State University Institutional Review Board and the Office for Human Research Protection).  We 
will use a coded study number in place of your name on study records.  The information you 
provide will be stored electronically on a firewall and password-protected computer.  Your code 
identification will be kept in a separate, password-protected file.  Your name and other data that 
may associate you with this study will not appear when we present this study and publish its 
results.  The findings will be summarized and reported in group form.  You will not be identified 
personally. 
  
VI.  Contact Persons: 
You may contact any of the researchers conducting this study at any time. 
 
Contact information: 
Catrina Jones, cjones183@student.gsu.edu, (678) 592-1619 
Dr. Danny Bellenger, dbellenger@gsu.edu, (404) 401-2424 
 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a participant in this research study, you 
may contact Susan Vogtner in the Office of Research Integrity at (404) 413-3513 or 
svogtner@gsu.edu. 
 
VI. Copy of Consent Form to Subject: 
We will provide you a copy of this signed consent form for your records. 
 
 
If you are willing to voluntarily participate in this research study, please sign below: 
 
 
Participant _________________________  Date: ____________________ 
 
If you decline to participate in this research study, no further action is requested.  Thank you for 
your time and consideration. 
 
  
  
131 
Exhibit E-2:  Contact Summary Form 
 
Contact Summary Form 
 
Contact Date: ________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Name:  ________________________________________________ 
 
Site:   ________________________________________________   
 
Contact Phone:   ________________________________________________  
 
Written by:   ________________________________________________
 
 
 
1.   What were the main issues or themes that struck you in this contact?  
 
 
2. Summarize the information you got (or failed to get) on each of the target questions you had 
for this contact.
  
 
 
3. Anything else that struck you as salient, interesting, illuminating or important in this           
contact?  
 
 
4. What new (or remaining) target questions do you have in considering the next contact with 
this site?  
 
  
Question Category Summary Response 
Organizational contexts and processes  
Portfolio selection  
Dealing with uncertainty and complexity  
Individual portfolio decision aspects  
Organization and individual goals  
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Exhibit E-3:  Email Invitation 
 
Dear [Manager]: 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study that will explore the portfolio decision making of 
managers within a pharmaceutical firm during a merger.  As a manager, you are in an ideal position 
to provide insights from your own experiences. 
 
This study will involve an interview of approximately 9 questions consisting of sub-questions.  
The interview is informal and will take approximately 45-60 minutes of your time.   We are simply 
trying to capture your experience as a portfolio decision-maker. Your responses to the questions 
will be kept confidential. Each interviewee will be assigned a number code to help ensure that 
personal information is not revealed during reporting. 
 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary. If you feel uncomfortable answering any 
questions, you may withdraw at any time. There is no compensation for participating in this study. 
However, your participation will be a valuable addition to our research and the findings could lead 
to greater understanding of portfolio management in the context of a merger. 
If you are willing to participate, please suggest a day and time that best suits you and I'll do my 
best to be available. If you have questions at any time about the interview and its procedures, you 
may contact Catrina Jones at the email address specified below. 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Catrina Jones 
Doctoral Candidate, Georgia State University 
cjones183@student.gsu.edu 
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APPENDIX F 
 
Exhibit F-1:  Pre- and Post-Merger Firm Performance  
 
Firm Pre-Merger 
Revenue  
%Growth or Decline  
in Post-Merger 
Revenue (range) 
Post-Merger Firm 
Performance (in terms 
of overall revenue) 
PharmaAlpha I <$10B <30% Growth 
PharmaAlpha II <$10B >30% Growth 
PharmaBeta <$10B >30% Growth 
PharmaGamma >$10B > 30% Growth 
PharmaDelta <$10B <30% Growth 
PharmaZeta >$10B >30% Decline 
PharmaETA >$10B >30% Decline 
PharmaTheta >$10B <30% Decline 
PharmaIota >$10B <30% Decline 
PharmaEpsilon >$10B <30% Decline 
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